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Abstract
This paper studies information acquisition under competitive pressure and proposes a model
to examine the relationship between product market competition and the level of innovative
activity in an industry. Recent empirical papers point to an inverted-U shape relationship
between competition and innovation. Our paper o¤ers theoretical support to these results while
employing a more accurate denition of innovation than the previous literature; more precisely,
we isolate innovation from riskless technological progress. The rms in our model learn of an
invention and decide on whether and when to innovate. In making this decision, rms face
a trade-o¤ between seeking a rst-mover advantage and waiting to acquire more information.
By recognizing that a rm can intensify its innovative activity on two dimensions, a temporal
and a quantitative one, we show that rms solve this trade-o¤ precisely so as to generate the
inverted-U shape relationship. When the competition in the pre innovation market is su¢ ciently
high, the level of competition in the post innovation market is endogenous. We investigate the
welfare e¤ects of innovation under competitive pressure and nd conditions that determine the
socially optimal level of competition. We study the e¤ects that the degree of technological
spread in the industry has on innovation and highlight the roles that strategic uncertainty and
the discreteness of the information acquisition process play in this context.
JEL Clasi¢ cation: D40, L10
Keywords: Innovation, Competitive Pressure, Information Acquisition.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies information acquisition under competitive pressure and employs the resulting
model to investigate the relationship between the degree of competition in an industry and the level
of innovative activity. The clear policy implications of the nature of this relationship generated
a large body of literature investigating it. Starting with the seminal work of Schumpeter(1943),
the objective of these studies has been to determine whether there is an optimal market structure
that results in the highest rate of technological advance. In particular, this literature tried to
reconcile the intuitive appeal of the Schumpeters assertion that only large rms possessing a sig-
nicant amount of monopoly power have the resources and incentives to engage in risky innovative
activity, with a substantial amount of empirical literature that suggested the opposite. Although
results vary, more recent empirical papers, such as Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Gri¢ th and Howitt
(2005) (henceforth, ABBGH(2005)) suggest an inverted-U shape relationship between product mar-
ket competition and innovation.1 Thus, according to these studies, for low levels of competition
an increase in competition induces more innovation, while for higher values of competition, as
competition increases, rms become less innovative.
Our paper adopts a microeconomic approach and studies the innovation process at rm level
by following a new project through its stages of development. The rms in our dynamic model
become sequentially aware of an invention and decide on whether and when to undertake a costly
investment in innovation. In taking this decision, rms face a trade-o¤between seeking a rst-mover
advantage and waiting to acquire more information. There are three novel contributions that our
study brings to the literature on innovation. First, we uncover the trade-o¤ between information
acquisition and competitive pressure as su¢ cient to generate the empirically observed inverted-U
shape relationship. Second, we identify two dimensions on which a rm can intensify the level
of its innovative activity, a risk dimension and a quantitative dimension, and reveal the e¤ect of
this breakdown in explaining that relationship. Finally, our model o¤ers theoretical support to the
newest empirical ndings while employing a more accurate denition of innovation than the one
used in ABBGH(2005), which is the only other paper to present a theoretical model that obtains
the inverted-U shape relationship.2 More precisely, the results in ABBGH(2005) hinge on including
in the denition of innovation the technological advancements made at no cost by laggard rms
who copy the technology of the leader.3 In contrast, the denition in our model is consistent with
1Scherer (1967) is the rst empirical paper to uncover this shape. See also Scott (1984) or Levin et al. (1985).
2The vast majority of the theoretical literature on this topic suggested a monotone relationship. For instance,
Caballero and Ja¤e (1993) or Martin (1993) support the Schumpeterian hypothesis while Schmidt (1997) or Aghion,
Harris and Vickers (1997) predict a positive relationship between competition and innovation. Boone (2000) nds
conditions under which more competitive pressure induces either more or less innovation, while Boone (2001) presents
a model that can generate non-monotone relationships of any nature. See also the discussion in Section 2 of this
paper of the Kamien and Schwartz (1976) model.
3 If the denition of innovation in ABBGH(2005) does not include these zero cost technological advancements, their
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the standard interpretation of innovation as being something new, di¤erent and usually better
than what existed before.4 We therefore isolate the innovative activity from riskless technological
progress. Finally, we also study the e¤ects that the degree of technological spread in the industry
has on innovation and highlight the roles that strategic uncertainty and the discreteness of the
information acquisition play in this context.5
The typical stages in the development of a new commercial product or process are presented in
the following gure:6
Applied research is aimed at gaining knowledge that will address a specic problem or meet
a specic need within the scope of that particular entity; successful applied research results in
an invention or the discovery of an idea that should work. In the invention stage, the idea also
passes through its rst tests. This is the research part of the phrase "research and development".
The product development, also called the innovation stage, is the rst commercial application of
an invention; it requires renement of the invention and the developing of a marketable product.
Large R&D labs spend most of their resources on innovation.7 The ideas generated through applied
main monotonicity result does not hold anymore unless the hazard rate of these events is insignicant. However, for
small values of this hazard rate, it is straightforward to see that their model predicts that the industry structure will
be such that the Schumpeterian e¤ect will always dominate.
4Schumpeter(1934) denes economic innovation as the introduction of a new good, the introduction of a new
method of production, the opening of a new market, the use of a new input of production or the implementation of
a new organizational structure.
5Also, our model can be seen as a study of product innovation in which new products are introduced in the market.
This di¤ers from most of the current theoretical literature on innovation, including ABBGH(2005), which focuses on
the study of technological advancements that consist of process innovations in which existing products are produced
at a lower average cost.
6See Manseld (1968b) for an excellent in depth analysis of the innovation decision making at rm level.
7For instance, of the $208.3 billion spent on industrial R&D in the United States in 2004, $155.1 billion (or 74.5
percent) were spent for development. Source: National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources Statistics.
2008. Research and Development in Industry: 2004.
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research go through a screening process and a small share of them end up being implemented in
marketable products.8
The model in our paper has a set of rms who, sequentially, become informed about an invention
that could render future gains to its investors, provided that it is a success from technological and
business standpoints. Once a rm learns of the invention, it has the option of investing in the
project at any time. Initially, the rms knowledge about the feasibility of the project is scarce, so
investment is relatively risky.9 As time passes, the rm acquires additional information, and is able
to better assess its chances of success.10 The additional information may eventually lead the rm
to decide not to invest in the project. This may make waiting benecial because it can potentially
help avoid the nancial losses associated with the development of an unsuccessful product. On the
other hand, in our model, earlier investors end up releasing the product earlier, and thus enjoy a
natural rst-mover advantage.11
These two features of the model induce a trade-o¤ in the rms problem between investing
early to enjoy the rst-mover advantage, and waiting to acquire new information and reduce the
risk of investment. Manseld(1968b, p. 105) underlies this trade-o¤ in the rms decision making
process. Thus, as he states, one the one hand, "there are often considerable advantages in waiting,
since improvements occur in the new product and process and more information becomes available
regarding its performance and market". On the other, "there are disadvantages... in waiting,
perhaps the most important being that a competitor may beat the rm to the punch...". He
concludes: "if the expected returns... justify the risks and if the disadvantages of waiting outweigh
the advantages, the rm should innovate. Otherwise it should wait. Pioneering is a risky business;
whether it pays o¤ is often a matter of timing". Now clearly, the presence of this trade-o¤ suggests
8To illustrate this breakdown of the development process, Kotler and Armstrong (2005) quote a management
consultant as saying: For every 1000 ideas, only 100 will have enough commercial promise to merit a small-scale
experiment, only 10 of those will warrant substantial nancial commitment, and of those only a couple will turn out
to be unqualied successes.
9Mansed et al. (1977, p. 9) found that the probability that an R&D project would result in an economically
successful product or process was only about 0.12; the average probability of technical completion for a project was
estimated to be 0.57.
10This information can be technological, in the form of test results, or knowledge about the technological trend
for the complementary products. For instance, the potential developers of a new hybrid car may have had an
incentive to wait, so that more e¢ cient electric batteries would be produced. Second, this new information could
also be commercial in the form of marketing research. For instance, the same hybrid car manufacturer may have
waited to study whether and how many consumers would be willing to compromise and accept the relatively weaker
performance of this new product. Third, the information may come in the form of knowledge about the overall
economic environment. For instance, hybrid cars were only moderately, if at all, successful until just a few years ago,
but they are in relatively high demand now.
11For instance, while there are plenty of hybrid models that have been launched recently, the earlier investors,
Toyota and Honda have a clear technological and commercial advantage in that market. As Porter (1990) states:
"early movers gain advantages such as being rst to reap economies of scale, reducing costs through cumulative
learning, establishing brand names and customer relationships without direct competition, getting their pick of best
sources of raw materials and other inputs... The innovation itself may be copied but the other competitive advantages
often remain". See Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) for a comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical
literature analyzing the rst mover advantage in innovation.
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that, generically, rms will neither invest immediately in all inventions nor wait until all uncertainty
is removed. However, it is not immediately clear how rms adjust their innovative activity in
response to a change in competition. Moreover, it is not a priori obvious whether this adjustment
is monotonic as most other theoretical papers concluded or non-monotonic as the newest empirical
evidence suggests. Studying how rms make these adjustments is the main objective of the paper.
A more innovative industry is dened to be one in which rms allocate a larger budget to the
innovative activity.12 There are two channels for a rm to increase its innovative expenditures.
First, the rm can invest earlier in any given project, thus undertaking riskier projects.13 Given
a constant ow of ideas, this leads to more inventions reaching the innovation stage where the
substantial nancial commitment to the project is made. Second, the rm may decide to invest
in an increasing fraction of the projects that attain a certain probability of success. An increase
in this fraction leads to an increase in the level of innovative activity. We will show that for
low levels of competition, rms invest in all projects that attain a likelihood of success higher
than a certain threshold. For these low values, as competition increases, the threshold decreases
and thus rms undertake riskier projects and become more innovative. On the other hand, for
high levels of competition, rms react to an increase in competition by investing in a decreasing
fraction of the projects that reach a given threshold, thus being less innovative. This suggests
that when the pre innovation level of competition is high, the competition in the post innovation
markets is endogenous. More precisely, as competition increases, the fraction of rms that undertake
any specic project decreases, lowering the post innovation level of competition. From a policy
perspective, this nding implies that the positive welfare e¤ects of increasing competition have
only a limited scope. Finally, we show that for high values of competition, if the technological
spread in the industry increases when competition increases, rms also respond by investing in
safer projects; this further decreases the level of the innovative activity.
The key driving force in our model is the e¤ect of an increase in product market competition
on the marginal cost of waiting for more information. For low levels of competition, rms expect
positive prots from innovation and invest in all projects that are su¢ ciently safe. They decide
on the optimal moment of investment by comparing the marginal benet and the marginal cost of
waiting for more information. When competition increases, the marginal cost of waiting increases
exceeding the marginal benet earlier and thus inducing rms to invest earlier. On the other
12AGBBH (2005) employ patent count data as a primary measure of innovation, but as a robustness check, they
also use R&D expenditures as an alternative measure. The same inverted-U shape relationship emerges.
13From a policy perspective, taking a riskier decision is, on the one hand, decreasing total welfare, because of the
expenses incurred on projects that ultimately prove unsuccessful. On the other hand, it also implies that a successful
product will be released earlier; this improves welfare by delivering the corresponding benets earlier and by generating
other further inventions based on that new product. Basically, rms in any industry almost always develop a new
product that would deliver positive economic prots almost surely, provided that the required nancial means are
available. But if the rm or industry has waited a long period of time before making the investment, it cannot
necessarily be considered innovative. For instance, any major car manufacturer would invest in the development of
a hybrid car now, but only a few of them were willing to take that risk 20 years ago.
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hand, for the higher values of product market competition, each rms expected prot from the
innovation approaches the competitive outcome and becomes virtually zero. When competition
further increases, to continue to break even, rms need to be less innovative. They do this by
investing in a decreasing fraction of projects. While investing later would ensure non negative
expected prots, the resulting strategy prole would not be an equilibrium. This is because the
marginal cost curve would continue to shift up and therefore the trade-o¤ between marginal cost
and marginal benet of waiting would continue to be solved at earlier times.
The dynamic setting of the model allows studying the case when the increase in competition
alters the technological spread in the industry, dened as the length of time it takes for all rms to
make the technological breakthrough. In our model, rms are not informed of the exact moment
when other rms learned of the same invention.14 The absence of this piece of information and the
fact that the rms payo¤ depends on the investment decisions of the other rms in the industry
introduces strategic uncertainty in the rmsdecision problems. An increase in technological spread
then leads each rm to assign a higher probability to the event that the innovation has already
started in the industry at any given moment. This induces more pessimistic beliefs about the
number of rms who will invest before the next piece of information arrives and thus increases the
marginal cost of waiting. As argued above, the upward shift of the marginal cost curve induces
rms to invest earlier for low levels of competition. For high values of competition, the e¤ect of the
belief updating is of second order, and is compensated by the rst order e¤ect of the decrease in the
fraction of projects that are undertaken. On net, the marginal cost decreases, which induces rms
to invest later, thus further reducing innovation. Thus, for higher values of competition, when the
technological spread increases, rms invest in a decreasing fraction of projects and wait longer.
In addition to the key comparative static result with respect to the value of product market
competition discussed above, the model o¤ers other predictions of interest. First, when the in-
novation costs increase, rms react by investing later for all values of competition. Second, an
increase in the speed of learning induces rms to invest in safer projects. Third, the innovation
maximizing level of competition is essentially independent of the cost of innovation. Fourth, the
model is successful at supporting additional empirical regularities that ABBGH(2005) observed.
Thus, we show that a lower level of technological dispersion in an industry results in an inverted-U
shape with a higher peak attained for a lower level of competition. Finally, we also investigate the
welfare e¤ects of innovation under competitive pressure. A social planner that aims at designing the
market structure most conducive of innovation has to take into account the e¤ects of an increase
in competition on the post innovation social welfare, on the rms risk taking behavior, on the
timing of innovations and on the degree of redundancy in parallel innovations. We nd conditions
that determine the level of competition that optimizes these welfare e¤ects of innovation and argue
14The sequential awareness assumption from our model is similar to the one used in Abreu and Brunnermeier
(1993) in a model of nancial bubbles and crashes.
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that, generically, this level is di¤erent than the one that maximizes the industry-wide innovative
activity.
A more comprehensive review of the literature is presented in section 2. The model is presented
in section 3, while the analytical results, their discussion and a numerical example are presented in
section 4. We also discuss in section 4 the welfare e¤ects of innovation and the case of continuous
information acquisition. The conclusion is in section 5. Most of the proofs are relegated to the
appendix.
2 Review of the literature
Schumpeter (1943) considered innovation to be the main determinant of technological progress
and an engine of economic growth and development. Discussing the role of market structure
in enhancing innovation, he distinguished between static and dynamic e¢ ciency by arguing: "a
competitive market may be perfectly suitable vehicle for static resource allocation, but the large
rm operating on a concentrated market is the most powerful engine of progress and ... long-
run expansion of total output" (Cohen and Levin, 1989, p. 1060). Motivated by Schumpeters
conjecture, many empirical studies have investigated the role that the rms size and the level of
product market competition play in inuencing innovative activity. However, the results have been
inconclusive.15 The rst of Schumpeters claims to be extensively tested is that the possession of
some ex ante market power is required for rms to have the means and incentives to engage in
signicant innovation activity. While studies by Scherer (1984), Pavitt (1987), Blundell, Gri¢ th
and Van Reenen (1999) found a positive linear relationship between rmssize and the intensity
of the R&D activity, Bound et al. (1984) found evidence contrary to this claim and Cohen et al.
(1987) found no conclusive e¤ect.
Supporters of the Schumpeterian view argued that larger rms have better access to capital,
are less risk averse due to diversication and enjoy economies of scale (the returns from innovation
are higher when the rm has a large volume of sales over which to spread the xed costs of R&D)
and economies of scope (large rms can benet from positive spillovers between various research
programs) from innovation. On the other hand, the opponents of the theory argued that as the
size of the rm increases, the e¢ ciency in R&D is undermined by the loss of managerial control,
while the incentives of individual scientists and engineers become attenuated. Second, Schumpeter
argued that innovation should increase with ex post market power because less competition increases
the rewards that are associated with successful innovations. This argument is the basis of the
current patent laws, which provide the expectation of ex-post market power as an incentive to
innovate. Studies such as Fellner (1951), Arrow (1962), Bozeman and Link (1983) have supported
15A detailed literature review of the earlier empirical literature can be found in Cohen and Levin (1989).
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Schumpeters hypothesis, whereas Porter (1990), Comanor and Scherer (1995), Geroski (1995),
Baily and Gersbach (1995) and Nickell (1996) rejected it. On the other hand, more recent studies,
that allowed for exible non linear relationships, such as Scherer (1967), Scott (1984), Levin et al.
(1985) and ABBGH (2005) found evidence of the inverted-U relationship between R&D intensity
and market concentration.16
The theoretical literature on this topic is also vast and the results have been mixed. Earlier
papers, such as Loury (1979), Grossmann and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992), Ca-
ballero and Ja¤e (1993), Martin (1993) sought to conrm the Schumpeterian hypothesis.17 On the
other hand, inspired by the seminal work of Hart (1983), more recent theoretical papers focusing
on managerial incentives, such as Schmidt (1997), Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1997) or Aghion,
Dewatripont and Rey (1999), proposed models in support of the positive correlation between com-
petition and innovation observed in some of the empirical papers.18 The main drawback of this
strand of literature is that the prot maximization assumption at the managerial level is replaced
with a less convincing assumption of minimizing innovation costs, subject to the constraint that
the rm does not go bankrupt.19 Other theoretical papers in support of this positive relationship
are Aghion, Harris and Vickers (1995), whose approach is close to the one from ABBGH (2005)
and Aghion and Howitt (1996) who endogenize the rate at which rms switch from old technologies
to new and show that an increase in the substitutability between the old and new product lines
will induce rms to adopt the new technologies faster. Boone (2000) obtained conditions under
which more competitive pressure induce either more or less innovation to individual rms depend-
ing on their e¢ ciency level. Finally, Kamien and Schwartz (1976) and ABBGH (2005) are the rst
theoretical models to obtain the inverted-U shape relationship.
ABBGH (2005) argue that the escaping the competition e¤ect is stronger in neck-and-neck in-
dustries,20 while the Schumpeterian e¤ect is stronger in less neck-and-neck industries. The inverted-
U shape curve emerges because the fraction of neck-and-neck industries in the economy changes in
response to a change in competition. Kamien and Schwartz (1976) present a model of innovation
under rivalry in which rms decide on the optimal moment to innovate while facing the following
trade-o¤. On the one hand, spending more time on developing a product induces an decreased and
convex cost of innovation. On the other, it increases the risk that some rival rm would innovate
rst. As in our model, rms adjust their innovation behavior in a manner consistent with the
inverted-U shape relationship between competition and innovation. However, there are a number
of issues with the model in this paper. First, the measure of rivalry that Kamien and Schwartz use,
16When ABBGH(2005) imposed a linear relationship in their regression analysis, the results were consistent with
the ones from the earlier empirical literature, which had yielded a positive slope. This suggests a possible explanation
for the previous spurious conclusions.
17See Cohen and Levin (1989) for a detalied overview of this literature.
18See Aghion and Howitt (1998) and Boone (2000) for excellent reviews of this literature.
19These innovation costs are seen to increase the managers e¤ort in adapting to the new technology.
20Neck-and-neck industries are dened as industries in which rms are at technological par.
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the expected time of innovation by the other rm, leaves aside other interesting cases - for instance,
the case in which an increase in competition is associated with a decrease in post innovation prots.
Second, and more importantly, the model ignores potential strategic considerations. While the rm
under consideration changes its behavior by investing earlier or later as a response to the rivals
expected time of innovation, the rival does not do so.
Our paper is also related to the very broad literature on timing of irreversible actions under
uncertainty. Jensen (1982) presents a model of information acquisition in which the incentive
to innovate earlier is provided by the discounting of future revenues rather than the competitive
pressure. Chamley and Gale (2005) study a model of endogenous information acquisition in which
rms learn about the protability of a common value investment from the actions of the other
players, while Decamps and Mariotti (2004) allow in addition for a private value component of
the investment and for exogenous information. Caplin and Leahy (1993) develop a model in which
investors learn of the protability of new industries from the success of the earlier entrants. Finally,
the strategic experimentation literature (see Bolton and Harris (1999), Cripps, Keller and Rady
(2005)) studies the problem of costly information acquisition about the common value of a project
when each agent can learn from the experimentation of the other players. In a di¤erent direction,
our paper shares the rst-mover advantage feature with the patent race literature (see for instance
the seminal paper by Reinganum (1983)). What distinguishes the current model from this literature
is mainly the source of uncertainty. In the patent race literature, the uncertainty was generated
by the fact that the technological advancements were the outcome of a random process, or by the
fact that the nish line was random. In contrast, in our model, the uncertainty stems from the fact
that the rm does not know whether the project is successful or not; in other words, it does not
know the state of the world.
3 The Model
3.1 The Technology
There is a continuum of identical and risk neutral rms who, sequentially, learn of an invention
at moments denoted by ti for rm i. A mass a of rms becomes aware at each instant t, with
t 2 [t0; t0 + ],  > 1 and  > 0.21 The moment t0 is not known by any of the rms, but it
has a prior distribution, which is common knowledge among the rms in the industry. This prior
distribution is uniform on the real line.22 After the rm learns of the new idea, it may invest in its
21As standard in the literature, the continuum hypothesis employed here can be interpreted simply as the distrib-
ution of the unknown locations on the timeline of a nite number of rms.
22We use this nonstandard distribution to avoid boundary e¤ects. As an alternative to using it we may discard the
assumption of the existence of a common prior. Thus, instead of having the posterior beliefs of the rms about t0
at the initial moment when they become aware of the invention be derived from a common prior about t0, we may
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development at any time with a one-time sunk xed cost c of innovating.23 As we argue later, a
can be interpreted as a counterpart of the Lerner index, that is, an inverse measure of the ability
of the rms in an industry to collude. On the other hand, , the length of the so called awareness
window, constitutes a measure of the technological spread in the industry.
The timeline corresponding to the case in which the rm i waits  time units before investing,
is presented in the Figure 2.
The information acquisition is modelled as follows.24 Before moment ti, the rms R&D de-
partment engages in applied research aimed at gaining knowledge with the purpose of using that
knowledge for commercial purposes.25 At moment ti, when rm i becomes aware of an invention,
it has a belief p0 about the chance of the investment project being ultimately successful.26 Then,
after every  units of time, the rm performs a test against some of the potential technological
or commercial problems that the project might encounter. In the state of the world in which the
consider directly that these beliefs are actually the rms prior on t0 at that moment.
23 It is straightforward to see that the cost c can be interpreted in the rest of the model as the expected present
value of all future expenditures on the development of this new product, without changing the qualitative results.
Thus, the specication of a one time cost is inessential. Also, to simplify the analysis, we assumed that the research
phase is costless; this assumption can be easily dropped, but all the salient results remain the same.
24Since the necessary tests should be identical for all rms, it is natural to have all rms go through the same
information acquisition process. This can be slightly relaxed to have each rm i believe that the rest of the rms go
through the same information acquisition process as the process that rm i goes through.
25Note here that, before becoming aware of the invention, the rm is completely unaware of the model as a whole.
In other words, only at the exact instant when the rm learns about the new idea, does the rm also learn about the
model as presented here. This is intuitive in that it makes sense for a rm to not hold beliefs about the characteristics
of an object of which it is unaware. Moreover, this unawareness assumption can be discarded if we interpret the
notion of "becoming aware" as discovering the product. For instance, all rms in an industry might be looking for
a cure for some disease and have the same common prior about the model as described above. However, only those
that discover a potential cure for that disease contemplate an investment decision. This interpretation allows for a
common prior of the model, while still preserving the sequential awareness assumption.
26Manseld (1968a, ch.3) presents in detail the process by which R&D proposals and budgets were generated and
evaluated within the central research laboratory of a major electronic, electrical equipment and appliance manufac-
turer. The three dimensions on which projects were evaluated were: (1) probabilities of commerical and technical
success; (2) additional prot generated; (3) cost of innovation. Each proposed project was assigned precise estima-
tions for each of these variables at di¤erent levels of management. This anectdotal evidence underlies the importance
that measurable risk of investment plays in the innovative decision-making process at rm level.
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project is successful, the tests are always passed. If the project is unsuccessful, some tests may still
be passed. Slightly more formally, if the project is successful, the signal received is always Pass. If
the project is unsuccessful, the signal may be either Passor Fail. The unconditional probability
of a Passsignal to be received at moment ti+t, where t 2 Z+  f; 2; 3; :::; tM g, is e  < 1.
At the time tM  min ft 2 Z+ : t        ln p0g, which is the rst moment when the posterior
probability that the project is successful is no lower than e , the rm receives a "Pass" signal if
and only if the project is successful. Thus, at tM+ if all tests have been passed, the rm knows for
sure that the project is successful. In Appendix A4, we present the specic sequence of conditional
probabilities that generate this signal structure in a manner consistent with Bayesian updating.
There are three salient features in our model. The rst is that rms are not informed of the exact
moment when other rms became aware of the same invention. This assumption has three merits.
First, it captures the real world uncertainty that rms face. Second, it e¤ectively induces a smooth
marginal cost of waiting and thus a smooth payo¤ function essential for equilibrium existence.
Finally, it helps obtaining the inverted-U shape when the increase in competition is associated with
an increase in the technological spread in the industry. The second feature is that of a discrete
information acquisition. Besides being in line with the reality of our particular application, this
discreteness helps deliver the main results of the paper in together with the strategic uncertainty
assumption. The last salient feature of the model is a single crossing property between the marginal
cost of waiting and the marginal benet of waiting as functions of time in equilibrium. The marginal
cost of waiting for more information is naturally increasing over time since, in expectation, the
marginal loss from a late release is higher when the product is closer to being a success than when
the product is just in an early stage of testing. On the other hand, the specic signal structure
dened above is chosen precisely because it implies a marginal benet of waiting that is constant in
time, which immediately ensures the single crossing property. The constant marginal benet and
the rest of the functional forms make the analisys of our discrete dynamic model tractable, and
allows for a closed form solution and thus for potential further applications. However, by following
the intuitive arguments o¤ered for the main results of the paper, it will be clear that these results
hold for more general specications that imply the single crossing property.
3.2 The Payo¤s
At moment ti + t, if rm i invests in a project which will ultimately turn out to be successful, its
post innovation prots are given by:27
(t; ti; t0) = 1 m(tjti; t0)  1
2
n(tjti; t0) (1)
27Note that t does not represent a calendar time, as t0 or ti represent, but it is the length of time passed since
the rm became aware of the innovation. The conditioning on t0 is required because this determines the measure of
rms who became aware of the innovation before t+ ti.
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where m(tjti; t0) is the measure of rms that innovate before rm i and n(tjti; t0) is the measure of
rms that innovate at the same time as rm i. To isolate the e¤ect of the competitive pressure in
inducing rms to invest earlier, we assume no intertemporal discounting. The functional form in
(1) can be seen as a reduced form of a model in which rms that invest in innovation earlier have
a higher chance of releasing the product earlier and thus of enjoying the rst mover advantage.
Alternatively, one may think of the functional form as a reduced form for a patent race model in
which rms that engage earlier have a higher chance of winning.28 The motivation for the particular
e¤ect of n(tjti; t0) on (t; ti; t0) is a natural rationing rule in which, if a mass of rms innovate at
the same time, each of these rms is considered to have a median rank in the group. The functional
form in (1) ensures that the total amount of prots available from a successful innovation across the
industry does not depend on the particular distribution of the moments when rms in the industry
innovate. We state this fact formally in the following Remark. For an arbitrary distribution of
innovation times in the industry, denote by G(t) the measure of rms who has invested by time t.
Remark 1 The total amount of prots earned in the industry is independent of the distribution
G().
Proof. See Appendix A1.
We will consider throughout the paper that c is high enough so that if all rms released the
product before rm i, then, even if the project succeeds, rm i makes negative prots, i.e.
(1  a)  c < 0 (2)
This condition eliminates the uninteresting case in which rms wait so long that they eventually
invest in innovation under almost certainty. In real world, laggard rms frequently choose not to
invest in innovation, and instead they either purchase the license for the new product, wait for the
patent to expire, or copy the new technology through reverse engineering if it is not protected.
28One could make the post innovation prots depend also on the measure of rms that invest after rm i. In that
case a su¢ cient statistic for the rm is prots would be the pair ( ; i), where   is the total measure of rms that
stay in the post innovation market and i 2 [0; ] is the rank of rm i. In this case, in a second stage of the game
that would follow all investment decisions and full information revelation, the laggard rms that would experience
negative post innovation prots would exit the market. The only o¤ equilibrium path actions would be for some
rms incuring negative prots to stay in the market and for some rms making positive prots to exit it. Standard
backward induction arguments reveal these possible devitations to be inconsequential for the rst stage. Thus, in
the rst stage of the game, which is the model we are analyzing in this paper, all rms would know  . To avoid
uninteresting complications, we specify the post innovation prots only as a function of the rank i as in (1).
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3.3 The Measure of Competition
Competition has been modeled in the literature in several ways. Boone (2008) shows that the salient
feature common to all theoretical parametrizations of competition is that an increase in competition
always raises the relative prot shares of the more advanced rms and reduces the prots of the least
advanced rm active in the industry. We show in Appendix A2 that in our model these conditions
are satised when the increase in competition is parametrized by an increase in a, an increase in ,
or an increase in a.29 A higher value of a means that the product market competition increases
while the length of the awareness window  remains xed. We dene the technological spread in
an industry to be the length of time it takes for all rms to learn of the innovation. Thus, an
increase in a is associated with an increase in competition that does not change the technological
spread in the industry.
On the other hand, an increase in  parametrizes an increase in competition that also increases
the technological spread. For instance, if the number of rms in the industry increases, one would
expect that it takes longer for all of them to discover a solution to a certain problem. In fact,
using the total factor productivity as a proxy for the technological level of a rm and the price-cost
margin to measure competition, ABBGH(2005) show empirically that the average technological
gap in an industry increases with competition.30 In our paper, we will focus the discussion on the
two polar cases when the competition is measured by a or . To simplify exposition, with a slight
abuse of notation, we denote by x the parameter that measures the value of competition, and we
will specify precisely which case we consider only when the distinction is meaningful.
As a side point here, note that while in the above the parameter a was interpreted as the
mass of rms in the industry that learn of the invention at any particular time, it can also be
interpreted simply as the inverse measure of the degree to which the rms in the industry are able
to collude.31 Therefore, our model can also be used, for instance, to describe a duopoly, in which
an increase in a is associated with a decrease in the ability of the two rms to collude. Since each
candidate parameter for measuring competition in our model can be interpreted in a variety of
ways, depending on how competition is measured in a particular application, we remain agnostic
29To understand this, assume that there are m rms in the industry and that starting at t0 rms become aware of
the invention at constant rate a. Then, if rms become aware independently of each other, the resulting arrival process
is distributed Poisson(a), while, conditional on t0, the time Tm when the mth rm becomes aware is distributed
Gamma(m;a). In particular, the expected time for the mth rm to learn of the invention is E(Tm) = m
a
. In other
words, the total number of rms in the industry can be written as m = aE(Tm). Thus, an increase in the number
of rms can be parametrized either by an increase in a or an increase in E(Tm) or an increase in aE(Tm). For
tractability reasons, in our model, conditional on t0, the time Tm is deterministic and takes value .
30Clearly that, by parametrizing an increase in competition with an increase in a coupled with a decrease in ,
one could study the e¤ects on innovation of an increase in competition that decreases the technological spread.
31To see this, note rst that the expected measure of rms who became aware of the invention before any given
rm is a 
2
. Therefore, in a symmetric equilibrium, the expected prot of any rm, given that the project ends up
being successful, is 1   a 
2
  c. This is also the average prot of the rms across the industry. So an increase in a
lowers the average prots in the industry.
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with respect to exactly what these parameters mean precisely. This preserves the highest level of
generality for our model.
4 Results
4.1 The Equilibrium
The main result of the paper describes the equilibrium of our model. This equilibrium is completely
characterized by the time rms wait before investing, (x), and by the probability with which rms
pursue the project, (x). As common for other models with mixed-strategy equilibria, (x) can
also be interpreted as the fraction of projects into which the rm invests, and we will sometimes
refer to it as such in the rest of the paper. Proposition 2 and its corolaries describe the salient
qualitative features of the equilibrium of our model. The proof of these results as well as more
precise statements, with the exact conditions determining (x), (x) and the cuto¤ x, can be
found in Appendix B.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, there exists a threshold x such that:
(i) For x < x, (x) = 1 and rms expect strictly positive prots from innovation.
(ii) For x > x, (x) < 1 and rms expect zero prots from innovation.
Corollary 3 When x := a, for a > a, all rms wait the same amount of time (a) before mixing
between investing and not investing. When x := , there exists a sequence 0 =  < 1 < 2 < :::
such that:
(i) for  2 [2k; 2k+1] rms wait () before mixing between investing and not investing.
(ii) for  2 [2k+1; 2k+2], rms mix among investing after (), investing after () + , and
not investing at all.
In Appendix B4 we nd conditions under which rms invest as soon as they learn of the invention
and conditions under which they invest only in perfectly safe projects. As expected, rms invest
immediately when p0 is su¢ ciently high, and wait until they remove all uncertainty if the level of
competition is su¢ ciently low.32 The next two results discuss comparative statics. First, denote
by pt the belief of rm i in the success of the project at ti + t.
32For certain values of the parameters, there exist equilibria as described by Proposition 2 in which () > .
Thus, in this type of equilibrium there is a moment when there are more than enough rms in the industry aware of
the invention to invest and render the prots of the remaining rms negative without any of them actually investing
yet. Moreover, in an equilibrium in which () > 2, there is a moment when all rms know that the remaining
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Corollary 4 (i) (x) is increasing in c for all levels of competition.
(ii) p(x) is increasing in  for all levels of competition.
The proof of this corollary follows immediately from the precise characterization of the equi-
librium in Proposition 2. The rst statement of the corollary suggests that when the innovation
costs are higher, rms wait more before innovating. Put di¤erently, the higher the prots that the
innovations promise in case of success, the more risky the projects undertaken. Second,  measures
the speed of learning. Thus, the corollary states that, all else being equal, when rms learn faster
about the protability of new products, they end up investing in safer projects. The e¤ect on
the equilibrium value of waiting time is ambiguous because while an increase in  increases the
equilibrium value of the belief in the ultimate success of the project, it also increases the speed of
learning and thus, that belief level may be attained earlier. To pin down the sign of that e¤ect
precisely, one needs to know the values of the rest of the parameters of the model.
The comparative static of interest is the one with respect to the measure of competition. The
result is presented in the next corollary.
Corollary 5 For x < x, (x) is decreasing. For x > x, (x) is decreasing, while (x) is constant
when x := a, and increasing when x := .
We present rst the intuition for this Corollary for the case when the increase in competition
is parametrized by an increase in a. First, for low levels of competition, the post innovation
prots from a successful project are signicant, and thus rms expect strictly positive prots from
innovation. Therefore, the optimality condition that drives the rms response is the one that solves
the trade-o¤ between the marginal cost (henceforth, denoted MC) and marginal benet (MB) of
waiting for an additional informative signal. The MC of waiting for rm i is the expected decrease
in post innovation rents due to the expected loss in rst mover advantage.33 On the other hand,
the MB is the additional information provided by the signal; in monetary terms, the MB can be
measured as the expected forgone costs on an unsuccessful project. As explained in Section 3.1,
the MC and MB curves satisfy a single crossing property.
An increase in a shifts the MC curve upwards, while the MB curve is una¤ected. Therefore,
for small values of a, as a increases, rms respond by waiting less in equilibrium. In the literature,
this is called the "escaping the competition e¤ect". Above a certain level of competition, a, there is
rms know about the invention and still nobody invests. These types of equilibria are sustainable because, while all
rms may know of the invention and know that everyone else knows and so on up to any nite level, the invention is
not common knowledge among the rms until the product is actually released in the market for the rst time.
33We use the terms "marginal cost" and "marginal benet" in a loose sense, without giving a precise formal
denition. We employ them only to provide intuition regarding the trade-o¤ that the rms face in deciding on
whether to wait for one more piece of information or to invest immediately.
15
no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. If all rms that became aware of the new product before
some rm i, have already invested at the rst moment when the MC of waiting exceeds the MB
for rm i, then the expected measure of rms who would release the product before rm i would
be too high for rm i to expect non-negative prots from investing in the project. Conversely, if
rms were to just respond to the increase in competition by investing later, then each rm would
have an incentive to deviate and invest earlier. Thus, no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium, in
which all rms invest in the project is sustainable.
Instead, for a > a rms mix between innovating and not innovating, thus e¤ectively investing
in only a fraction of the projects. Therefore, they respond to increased competition by being less
innovative. In line with the Schumpeterian argument, the explanation is that in highly competitive
industries, the potential revenues from a successful new product are divided among many rms
and thus each rms expected prot from the innovation is virtually zero. When the technological
spread does not change, rms reduce their level of innovative activity by investing with a decreasing
probability (a) 2 (0; 1). This endogenizes the level of competition in the post innovation markets
and allows rms to expect nonnegative prots. Note that if (a) did not decrease, but instead rms
would continue to invest later, the MC curve would continue to shift up as a increases. Thus, the
trade-o¤ between the MC and MB of waiting, which determines the moment when the expected
prots from innovation are at their highest level, would continue to be solved earlier. But these
maximum prots would be negative. Thus, (a) needs indeed to decrease when a increases.
To understand the intuition for Corollary 5 in the case when the increase in competition also
increases the technological spread in the industry, we rst provide intuition for why the MC of
waiting increases when  increases, and discuss the elasticity of the MC curve with respect to .
We do these for the simplest case in which all rms wait for  periods before investing and restrict
attention to the case when t <  . Thus, note rst that at ti rm is posterior of t0, F0() is uniform
on [ti   ; ti]. Second, conditional on any t0, rm i will know that, according to the equilibrium
strategies of the other rms, the measure of rms who have already invested at any moment ti + t
is
m(tjti; t0;  ; x)  amin(;max(ti + t     t0; 0)) (3)
Note that innovation has already started at moment ti + t, that is, m(tjti; t0;  ; x) > 0 if and only
if t0 2 [ti   ; ti   (   t)]. Then, the expected measure of rms who have invested at ti + t is
(tjti;  ; x)  Et0 [m(tjti; t0;  ; x)] =
Z ti
ti 
m(tjti; t0;  ; x)dF0(t0) (4)
It follows that 1a
@
@t(tjti;  ; x) =
R ti ( t)
ti  dF0(t0); this is precisely the measure of the set of
values of t0 for which innovation has already started in the industry at moment ti + t. Thus,
waiting for additional t time units increases the expected measure of rms who have invested
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by at multiplied by the probability that innovation has started in the industry. Straightforward
calculations show that @
2
@@t(tjti;  ; ) > 0. It follows that the instant MC of waiting at ti + t,
MC(t; ) = pt
@
@t(tjti;  ; ) is increasing in . This is because an increase in technological spread
induces more pesimistic beliefs about the moment when rms started learning of the innovation.
To understand this, note that from the view point of rm i, the earliest moment that innovation
could have started is ti+ , and second that  and t are xed. Therefore, when  increases, rm
i assigns a higher probability at moment ti + t to the event that innovation has already started.34
This makes waiting more costly. Finally, @ lnMC(t;)@ ln   1 for t 2 [   2 ;  ], so the MC curve is
inelastic with respect to , for t close to  . Intuitively, when t is close to  , rm i already assigns
a high probability that innovation has started, so an increase in the technological spread does not
alter the beliefs signicantly. For later use, note also that the MC curve becomes almost perfectly
inelastic at     as  ! 0. A somewhat similar argument shows that when t   , MC(t; ) is
again increasing in  and inelastic with respect to  for t 2 [ ;  + 2 ]. Since for t   , the event
that some rms have started investing has probability one, the main di¤erence is that an increase
in  increases the measure of the set of values of t0 for which all rms have already invested.
Now, for  < , as argued above, when  increases the MC increases and rms invest earlier.
Above , where the expected prots become zero, if rms were to just wait longer as  increases,
without a corresponding decrease in (), the MC curve would continue to shift up. This would
lead rms to solve the trade-o¤ earlier and incur negative prots. Thus () must decrease. More
precisely, () must decrease so that the expected prots in equilibrium, p()
 
1  12a()

stay
at zero, as necessary for the rms to be willing to randomize. As shown above, in equilibrium, the
MC curve is inelastic with respect to  around  . On the other hand, the MC curve is unit elastic
with respect to .35 This is because the decrease in () decreases the density of rms who invest
at any particular moment; therefore the total measure of rms who invest in any time period 
decreases by exactly the same fraction that () decreases. Since the magnitudes of the percentage
changes in () and  must be equal to keep expected prots at zero, the e¤ect of the decrease in
() dominates around  and thus lowers the marginal cost. On the other hand, since the MC is
increasing in time, the only relevant section of the MC curve for determining the new equilibrium
waiting time is the middle segment around  . Since the curve shifts down on this part, rms end
up investing later.
34The probability as of moment ti + t that the innovation has started is Pr (t0 2 [ti   ; ti   (   t))) =  ( t) .
This closed form solution is due to the simplicity of the posterior F0(), but since    t is xed, the intuition is clearly
valid for all su¢ ciently well behaved families of distributions fF 0 () :  > 0g, parametrized by , the nite length of
the support of F 0 ().
35As shown in the proof of Proposition 2, the MC of waiting for one more signal is pt(x)a

1  1
2

. The unit
elasticity is an artifact of the linearity of prots in (1). A more general su¢ cient condition for this argument to go
through is the the MC is elastic with respect to a. This is equivalent to the MC being convex in a and with  in
(1) being concave and decreasing in m(tjti; t0) + 12n(tjti; t0). A concave specication of  allows for a less steep fall
in prots for the earliest innovators. This is consistent with the presence of some further uncertainty regarding the
time of release which smooths the expected payo¤s and thus weakens the rst mover advantage in innovation.
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Note the distinct channels through which the two parameters a and  increase the MC of
waiting. An increase in a increases the expected measure of rms who invest in the time it takes
to acquire a new signal or increase the potential loss in post innovation prots from being beaten
to the punch by another rm.36 On the other hand, an increase in  alters the beliefs that rms
have regarding the event that innovation has already started in the industry. This underlies the
role that uncertainty plays in delivering the results of the model. Absent uncertainty, theMC does
not increase when  increases; the MC of waiting would be either a or 0 depending on whether
innovation has started or not in the industry. This would imply, for instance, that rms do not
respond by investing earlier for low values of competition.37
4.2 A Numerical Example
In this section, we illustrate the above theoretical results with a numerical example. We calibrated
the model with the following values of the parameters: c = 0:3,  = 0:4,  = 0:2. To also describe
the timing of innovation for the higher values of competition, we allowed for the technological spread
increases with competition and considered  = 100a. The following gure presents the results of
Proposition 2 by plotting the range of possible values for the equilibrium value of 1 p against the
total measure of competition a, as the level of competition increases. Note that 1  p measures
the risk that rms undertake, and thus is a measure of the innovation intensity in the industry.
The step function from Figure 3 depicts the equilibrium values of 1  p .
36To understand this, assume a simple setup in which, if the project is successful, the rst rm investing in the
product has a payo¤ of 1 and all the others have a payo¤ of x. Then, conditional on the product being ultimately
successful and on no other rm having already invested, the expected loss in post innovation rents from waiting for
one more piece of information is 1   x multiplied by the probability p that some other rm invests in the product
in that period. Clearly, if an increase in competition is associated with an increase in the number of rms in the
industry, then p should increase when the number of rms in the industry increases. On the other hand, if the
increase in competition a¤ects the post innovation prots, the following Boone (2008), the increase in competiton
should decrease x. In both cases, the conditional MC, which is p (1  x) increases.
37As a side point, note that rms invest earlier for high values of competition if the increase in competition is
associated with a lower level of technological spread in the industry. To see this, consider an increase in a coupled
with a decrease in  that increases the value of a. To keep (a; )a constant as required by the zero prot condition,
a(a; ) must increase by the same fraction that  decreases. Since MC (; ) is more elastic with respect to a(a; )
than with , this would make MC (; ) shift up and thus it would induce rms to continue investing earlier even
after they make zero prots. In this case the additional risk undertaken would be compensated by a lower level of
competition in the post innovation market.
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For any given value of competition, rms stop waiting for additional information if two condi-
tions are satised. First, their belief in the feasibility of the project should be high enough that
they expect non-negative prots from that investment. When all rms invest in the project, for
any amount of time t spent on acquiring additional information, this condition is satised whenever
1 pt is below the curve h in Figure 3. Second, theMC of waiting for one more piece of information
should exceed the MB of waiting for that information. In Figure 3, this is the case whenever 1 pt
is below the curve f2. Since the MC is increasing in time, it is su¢ cient to impose this condition
at  , so 1  p should fall below the curve f2.
On the other hand, rms need to postpone investing in innovation for  periods, which can
only happen if their belief in the feasibility of the project is low enough. More precisely, if 1   pt
were below f2 and below h, for some t <  , rms would deviate from the equilibrium strategy and
invest earlier. Since the MC is increasing in time, a su¢ cient condition for the equilibrium to be
sustainable is that rms have an incentive to wait at    . In Figure 3 this is the case whenever
1   p  is above f2. Now, f1 is dened such that whenever 1   p  is above f2, 1   p is above
the curve f1. Therefore, in order for all rms to wait for no more or less than  time units, 1  p
should fall in the area between the curves h, f1 and f2. Therefore, for low levels of competition the
bounds that drive the equilibrium value of 1   p are f1 and f2, which as Corollary 5 also shows
are both increasing in competition. Thus, for small values of the competitive fringe, rms react to
an increase in competition by being more innovative.
The shaded area between the curves g1, g2 and h represents the range of possible equilibrium
values of 1   p for the higher levels of competition. Curves g1 and g2 are the counterparts of f1
and f2 subject to the constraint that the expected prots are zero. Notice that there exist certain
values of a in between a11 and a22 or above a22, where the shaded area between the curves
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g1 and g2 does not contain any of the possible values of 1   p .38 The motivation for this fact is
rather involved and its presentation is deferred to the Appendix. As stated in Corollary 3, for those
values of competition, rms mix among three options and thus there exist two di¤erent possible
values of the equilibrium belief. It is possible that when competition increases above the highest
level that allows for a pure strategy equilibrium, rms mix among three options rather than two
as in Figure 3. Graphically, this occurs if the curve h does not intersect at the peak a horizontal
hashed line representing a value of 1   p , but instead intersects one of the vertical hashed lines.
Figure 3 conrms the fact that for these higher values of competition, rms react in equilibrium by
being less innovative when the competition in the industry increases.
4.3 The Innovation Maximizing Level of Competition
To provide some additional testable implications of our model, we examine the behavior of the
peak of the inverted-U shape curve. More precisely, we rst investigate the e¤ect of a change in the
cost of innovation on the values of competition that maximize the innovation in the industry and
on the corresponding equilibrium risk of innovation. Second, we argue that our model supports
theoretically two additional empirical facts uncovered by ABBGH(2005). These facts describe the
behavior of peak of the curve in response to a change in the average technological gap in the industry.
For uniformity of exposition, we dene the set of innovation maximizing levels of competition to be
the set of values of competition that induce the pure strategy equilibrium with the shortest waiting
time. An inspection of Figure 3 reveals that due to the discrete information acquisition process,
there exists a range of values of x that maximize innovation. In particular, in Figure 3, these values
are in between the levels of competition corresponding to the intersections of the highest horizontal
line 1  p with the curves f2 and h. However, as mentioned at the end of section 4.2, if the curve
h intersects a vertical hashed line at the peak, the upper bound of this set is instead determined
by the intersection of 1  p with the curve f1.
To understand the conditions that determine this set of values, note rst that as stated in
section 4.2, the MC of waiting at  is higher than the MB of waiting at  when 1   p is below
the curve f2, and is equal precisely when the two curves intersect. So the lower bound of the
interval, denoted by x0 is determined by the conditon that the MC and the MB of waiting at
ti +  are equal at the lowest possible equilibrium value of p . Denoting by S the event that the
project is successful and by F the event that the signal received is "Fail", the MB of waiting is:
c  Pr(F jS)  Pr(S). Since Pr(F jS) = 0, it follows that the MB of waiting is c  Pr (F ). On the
other hand, assuming that all other rms invest after waiting for  time units, the MC of waiting
at moment ti + t for rm i is the (expected) prot at moment ti + t, pt [1  (tjti;  ; x)], minus the
expected value as of moment ti+ t of the (expected) prots at moment ti+ t+ . This second value
38The set of possible levels for 1 p can be infered in the gure from the values that the step function takes below
a.
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is pt+ [1  (t+ jti;  ; x)] Pr
 
F

+0 Pr (F ). Since pt = pt+ Pr
 
F

, it follows then immediately
that the MC at ti+ t equals pt [(t+ jti;  ; x)  (tjti;  ; x)]. We have then that x0 is determined
by:
p(x0) [( (x0) + jti;  (x0) ; x0)  ( (x0) jti;  (x0) ; x0)] = cPr (F ) (5)
The upper bound of the interval, denoted by x, is determined by one of the following two conditions.
If the bound is at the intersection of h and 1  p , then the condition is that rms expect precisely
zero prots from innovation for that value of p while they all invest. Using the notation introduced
in (4), we can write this condition as39
p(x1) [1  ( (x1) jti;  (x1) ; x1)]  c = 0 (6)
On the other hand, if the upper bound is instead at the intersection of f1 and 1  p , the condition
is that the MC and the MB of waiting at ti +     are equal at the lowest possible equilibrium
value of p . Using the same reasoning as above, it can be argued that the corresponding equation
is:
p(x2)  [( (x2) jti;  (x2) ; x2)  ( (x2)  jti;  (x2) ; x2)] = cPr (F ) (7)
For any value of the parameter of interest, equations (5), (6) and (7) determine the two bounds
x0 () and x () = minfx1 () ; x2 ()g.
Comparative statics with respect to the cost of innovation. The following proposition
describes the comparative statics of the set [x0(c); x(c)] with respect to c:
Proposition 6 There exist four values of competition xL < xM < xH such that for all values of c,
we have x0(c) 2 [xL; xM ] and x(c) 2 [xM ; xH ]. Moreover, there exists a sequence c0 < c1 < c2 < :::
such that:
(i) when c = ck for some k  0, x0(c) = xM = x(c);
(ii) as c increases on (ck 1; ck], x0(c) increases continuously from xL to xM , while x(c) rst
increases continuously from xM to xH and then decreases continuously from xH to xM ;
(iii) (x) = k for all x0(c)  x  x(c) and c 2 (ck 1; ck].
Proof. See Appendix C1.
The upper bound increases when driven by f1 and decreases when driven by h. To understand
the result, note that since  (x0(c)) =  (x(c)), by substituting p(x0(c)) from (6) into (5), it follows
that the MC and MB curves at the peak of the inverted-U curve are proportional to the cost
of innovation c. Thus the adjustments of the MC and MB curves have the same amplitude at
39Since ( (x) jti;  (x) ; a; ) = 12a, equation (6) provides a simple functional form for p(x).
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the peak. Therefore, the set of values of competition that make the values of the MC and MB
approximately equal at the peak is the roughly the same for all values of c. This is precisely
what Proposition 6 suggests. In the limit, as  ! 0, the interval colapses to a single point and
the maximizing level of competition is the same for all values of c.40 Therefore, a change in the
cost of innovation does not have a meaningful e¤ect on the level of competition that maximizes
innovation. Finally, (iii) states that as the cost of innovation increases, the minimum possible
equilibrium waiting time increases. This is natural since at the peak of the inverted-U curve, rms
make almost zero expected prots so when the cost of innovation is higher, rms need to invest in
safer projects to ensure non negative prots.
Comparative statics with respect to the average technological gap. ABBGH(2005)
also study the relationship between the properties of the peak of the inverted-U shape curve and
the degree of what ABBGH(2005) call the "neck-and-neckness" of an industry. The measure of the
degree of neck-and-neckness in an industry that ABBGH(2005) use is the inverse of the average
technological gap between the rms in an industry and the technological leader of that industry.41
Using as a proxy for the technological gap between two rms the time between the moments when
the rms make a certain technological breakthrough, that is, between the moments when the rms
learn of the new invention, the average technological gap in our model is 1
R 
0 xdx =

2 . So  is
also a measure of the average technological gap. In the empirical part of the paper, ABBGH(2005)
show in Figure III that for the subsample of industries with a higher degree of neck-and-neckness,
the inverted-U curve has a higher peak and attains this peak at a lower level of competition than
the curve corresponding to the entire sample of industries. However, while the theoretical model
in ABBGH(2005) does support the rst of these two results, it does not support the second one.
We will show next that our model replicates both of these two additional empirical regularities if
our measure of technological gap can be considered as a proxy for the measure that ABBGH(2005)
use.
In order to study the comparative statics with respect to the average technological gap, we
will vary s  , while holding the total level of competition as measured by a constant. This
means that when s increases, a will decrease precisely so as to keep   a constant. Thus, in the
following,  will parametrize the level of competition. Holding  constant ensures that thechange in
the technological gap does not induce a change in competition, so that the desired e¤ect is precisely
identied. In line with the notation introduced above,

0(s); (s)

will denote the set of values of
competition that maximize innovation.
Proposition 7 There exists a sequence s0 < s1 < s2 < ::: such that:
40Note that this result, as well as the result of Proposition 7 below, does not hinge on a constant value of the MB
of waiting.
41ABBGH(2005) use the total factor productivity of a rm as a measure of the rms technological level.
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(i) as s increases on (sk 1; sk], 0(s) and (s) increase continuously in s;
(ii) when s = sk for some k  0, 0(s) = (s);
(iii) 0(sk 1) < 0(sk), (sk 1) < (sk);
(iv) () = k for all 0(s)    (s) and s 2 (sk 1; sk] with k+1 = k + .
Proof. See Appendix C2.
Thus, as s increases, the set of values of competition that maximize innovation essentially
moves to the right. On the other hand, the minimum possible pure strategy equilibrium waiting
time weakly increases. Conversely, when s decreases, that is, when the average technological gap
decreases or the degree of neck-and-neckness increases, the peak of the inverted-U curve will move
up and to the left. This is precisely what ABBGH(2005) uncovered empirically. Intuitively, when
the average technological gap decreases, each rm i expects that the moments when the rest of
the rms learned of the same invention are closer to the moment when rm i learned. In other
words, it increases the density of rms in the awareness window. This increases the MC of waiting
for more information at any moment, and therefore induces rms to invest earlier for any value of
competition. Moreover, since at the peak of the inverted-U curve rms make zero prots, the lower
equilibrium belief about the ultimate success of the investment that results from investing earlier
must correspond to a value of competition which is also lower.
4.4 Welfare Analysis
A frequent critique of the standard models of welfare analysis is that they are rooted in static
economic analysis aiming at minimizing the deadweight loss from monopoly while ignoring the
dynamic e¤ects of improvements in productivity or of the introducing of new products. A social
planner that aims at designing the market structure that generates the welfare maximizing level
of innovative activity has to account for a number of e¤ects that a change in product market
competition induces. First, in line with the standard model of welfare analysis, an increase in
competition lowers the deadweight loss in the post innovation market. Second, as shown in our
paper, the increase in competition changes the time rms wait before innovating, thus potentially
generating the benets from innovation earlier. Third, it induces an adjustment in the rms
risk taking behavior, thus determining the amount of resources spent on unsuccessful innovations.
Finally, it a¤ects the number of rms that engage into a specic line of research, thus potentially
inducing a change in the amount of resources exhausted on parallel innovations. A fully edged
model of the social planners problem would have to capture the welfare considerations in the post
innovation market. In particular, it should specify the type of innovation under consideration and
it should make a number of assumptions about the welfare benets, in terms of consumer and
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producer surpluses, that the innovation creates. This analysis is beyond the scope of our paper.
However, by employing a reduced form model of the post innovation market, one can dene the
social planers problem so that it captures all the other e¤ects that the market structure has on
innovation.
We denote by w(x) the ex post social welfare from a successful innovation as a function of
the ex post level of competition. According to the standard models of social welfare, it follows
that generically w0(x)  0, for x  xc where xc corresponds to a perfectly competitive market.
For instance, if the innovation results in a new good, xc is the level of competition at which the
marginal benet for society of one more unit - the market price - equals average cost of producing
all units. Thus, at xc, rms make zero prots in the post innovation market. Note that since at
x, where x is the threshold given by Proposition 2, rms make zero expected prots taking into
account the risk and cost of innovation, it must be that x  xc. We assume that the social planner
has a discount factor . Finally, to capture the e¤ect of parallel innovations, we assume that the
number of rms in the pre innovation market is xed at N , that they all contemplate the idea
of innovating, and that one rm is enough to develop the new product or process as long as the
invention is feasible. Then, given the equilibrium values of (x) and (x) derived in the previous
analysis, the social planners problem is to choose x to maximize:42
v(x) = e (+)(x)

p(x)w(x(x))

1  (1  (x))N  cN(x)	 (8)
For x < x, we showed that (x) = 1, so the social planners value function reduces to v(x) =
p0w(x)e
 (x)   cNe (+)(x). Abstracting away from discreteness issues, we can write:
v0(x) = p0w0(x)e (x)    0(x)p0w(x)e (x) + ( + ) 0(x)cNe (+)(x) (9)
Thus, an increase in competition increases the social welfare by increasing the post innovation
welfare (p0w0(x)e (x)) and by generating the innovation benets earlier (  0(x)p0w(x)e (x)),
and it lowers it through expenses incurred on unsuccessful projects (( + ) 0(x)cNe (+)(x)).
Certain conditions would determine an optimal level of competition lower than x, the level that
maximizes the innovative activity in the industry. First, this may happen when the industry-wide
innovation costs are high relative to the expected benets as measured by w(x). This may happen
when either the rm level innovation cost c or the number of rms in the industry N is high. Also
a lower level of competition is benecial when the innovation in the industry under consideration
is characterized by an inherent high degree of technological or commercial risk, that is when p0
is small. On the other hand, more competition is better when the social marginal benets in the
post innovation market, as measured by w0(x) are su¢ ciently high, or when the speed of learning
42Note that the probability of innovation is e (x), that is the probability that the rst (x) signals are positive.
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 is high - in this last case the society benets from the additional time spent on acquiring new
information.
On the other hand, when x > x, we have 0(x) < 0 and  0(x)  0. On the other hand, as
argued in section 4.1, for x > x, we have (x)x = x. Thus,
v0(x) =   0(x)p0w(x)e (x)

1  (1  (x))N+ ( + )(x) 0(x)cNe (+)(x) + (10)
+N0(x)p0w(x)e (x)(1  (x))N 1   0(x)cNe (+)(x)
First, when x = , as we showed,  0() > 0 so the increase in competition induces a later
(  0(x)p0w(x)e (x)

1  (1  (x))N), but safer (( + )(x) 0(x)cNe (+)(x)) innovation.
Second, the increase in competition decreases the probability that each rm would pursue that
particular line of research. On the one hand, this has the negative e¤ect that it lowers the chance
that the innovation would be completed in the industry (N0(x)p0w(x)e (x)(1   (x))N 1); on
the other, it reduces the redundancies in innovation ( 0(x)cNe (+)(x)). For values of x close
enough to x,  0(x) ' 0 because  achieves its minimum at x, while (1   (x))N 1 ' 0 because
(x) ' 1. Therefore, just above x the only non-negligible e¤ect of an increase in ex ante competi-
tion is the decrease in the redundancy e¤ect. Therefore, when the optimal level of competition is
not lower than x, it will always be higher. However, note that even when x = a, so that the delay in
innovation does not occur, it is never socially optimal to induce a too high level of product market
competition. To see this, note that p(a)w(a(a))  p(a)(a(a)) = c, where the rst inequality
comes from the fact that the rmsprots are included in the social welfare, while the second from
the zero prot condition. Since  0(a) = 0, it follows that v0(ac) < 0 and thus the optimal value of
competition is lower than ac. Intuitively, if the post innovation rents were too small, rms would
end up investing in few projects so many otherwise successful lines of innovation would not be
pursued.
4.5 Alternative Equilibria
As in many dynamic discrete time settings (see Obereld and Trachter (2010) for other examples)
alternative symmetric equilibria might emerge in our model. In particular, in our case rms could
mix among investing at di¤erent moments. Lemma 19 in Appendix C3 presents necessary conditions
for such an equilibrium. In the set-up of our model, these conditions are very restrictive for
symmetric equilibria other than the one from Proposition 2, and as illustrated numerically in the
appendix, generically, these conditions are not satised. This is because the single crossing property
between the MC and MB of waiting induces a concavity of the expected prot from innovation
in the waiting time which makes it impossible for rms to be indi¤erent among more than two
waiting times. Moreover, the two moments need to be  time units apart; otherwise rms would
deviate and invest in between the two moments. But these are precisely the conditions that dene
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the equilibrium of Proposition 2.
4.6 The Case of Continuous Information Acquisition
To underscore the relevance of the discreteness of the information acquisition process specication
from our model, we also present the main comparative statics with respect to the value of product
market competition under the assumption that the information acquisition is continuous. While
this is not always the case (see Obereld and Trachter (2010) for counterexamples), for this model it
is straightforward to show that assuming continuous information acquisition is equivalent to taking
the limit  ! 0, while the length of the awareness window  stays constant.
Proposition 8 When rms update their beliefs continuously, in a symmetric equilibrium there
exist two thersholds a;  such that:
(i) (a) is decreasing in a for a < a and a constant function of a for a > a; (a) is 1 for a < a
and is decreasing in a for a > a.
(ii) () is constant in  for  <  and increasing in  for  > ; () is 1 for  <  and is
decreasing in  for  > .
Proof. See Appendix C4.
Therefore, while the inverted-U shape curve emerges again when competition is measured by
a, it does not fully do so when the increase in competition is associated with an increase in the
technological spread in the industry. This is because the value of the MC around the equilibrium
waiting time does not increase when the length of the awareness window increases. To understand
why, recall from the discussion motivating the results in Corollary 5 that the MC curve is very
inelastic in the neighborhood around  . In particular, as  approaches 0 since according to the
equilibrium strategies of the other rms, innovation has almost surely started at  , no measurably
meaningful information arrives between     and  . Thus, an increase in  does not change the
value of the MC at    . A similar argument explains why the MC at  does not change. Since
MC is increasing in time, these are the only two values of the MC relevant for pinning down the
equilibrium strategies. Therefore, rms do not change their waiting time for the lower levels of
competition when  increases.43 For higher values of , as  increases,  must decrease to satisfy
the zero prot condition. This decreases the MC and induces rms to invest later.44 The results
43Note that this result does not hinge on a constant marginal benet of waiting in time.
44Note that when the increase in competition is associated with an increase in a, the e¤ect on the MC is of the
rst order and thus rms do wait less for the lower levels of competition. For the higher values, the e¤ects of the
increase in a and decrease in  perfectly compensate each other and the equilibrium waiting time stays constant.
26
in Proposition 8 underscore the importance of the discrete information acquisition process in this
setting.
5 Conclusion
The issue of innovation is complex and has many facets, some of which have been studied extensively
in the industrial organization literature over the past half a century. Our model uncovers two of
the main driving forces inuencing the level of innovative activity in an industry. These two forces
have not only the merit that they are su¢ cient to generate the empirically documented inverted-U
shape relationship between competition and innovation, but they also o¤er reason to believe that
they are indeed some of the major forces that inuence a rms innovation decisions. In order to
isolate the e¤ect of the trade-o¤ that we focus on, we abstract away from other factors that may
play a role in the rmsdecision making process. Clearly, enriching the model to include some of
these additional forces would improve the predictive power of the model.
The main policy implication of the results in our paper is that the way a policy maker should
stimulate the innovative activity in an industry is not by always decreasing the level of product
market competition, as Schumpeter suggested, or by always increasing it, as other economists who
looked for a linear relationship concluded. Instead, my paper argues that a more thorough empirical
analysis should be performed in order to nd the right way to use the tool of the market structure
design in promoting innovation for each industry under consideration.
A reduced form version of the model in this paper would have the marginal cost of waiting
and the marginal benet of waiting curves satisfying two conditions. First, they would exhibit
the single crossing property. Second, the marginal cost curve would shift up in response to an
increase in competition, while the marginal benet curve would stay xed. Then, an increase
in competition would decrease the time at which the two curves intersect and thus explain the
increase in innovation for the small values of competition. When this equilibrium waiting time
is su¢ ciently low, rms would expect zero prots from innovation and thus a further increase in
competition would require rms to become less innovative. The need for the fully edged model
in this paper stems mainly from three considerations. First, the reduced form model does not
explain the link between the level of competition, which is a parameter with immediate empirical
interpretation, and the marginal cost of waiting, whose interpretation is di¢ cult in the absence of
a well dened model. This is even more problematic when the increase in competition is associated
with an increase in the technological spread rather than an increase in the technological density.
Second, the reduced model would not immediately suggest the way in which rms can become
less innovative for higher values of competition. Simply stating that they would invest later is
unsatisfactory since the marginal cost of waiting would continue to increase and thus the trade-o¤
would be solved earlier rather than later. The model in this paper allows distinguishing between
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decreases in innovation that lead to a delay in innovation and decreases in innovation that lead to
a decrease in the number of projects undertaken. Finally, the model predicts additional testable
regularities that a reduced form model would not uncover.
Appendix
Appendix A1. Proof of Remark 1
Since G is a cumulative distribution function, it is right continuous and therefore the set of points
of discontinuity is countable. Denote this set by Sd = fs1; s2; s3; :::; sjSdjg, where jSdj can be 1,
and let s0  t0. Also, for any s 2 Sd denote by G(s )  lim
t!s 
G(s), and for any t 2 [t0;1)nSd
denote by g(t) the probability distribution function associated with G. Then, the total amount of
prots earned from the innovation in the industry is:
 =
X
s2Sd

1 G(s )  G(s) G(s )
2
  c

[G(s) G(s )] +
Z
t2[t0;1)nSd
[1 G(t)  c] g(t)dt =(11)
= a(1  c) 
X
i=1;:::;jSdj
"Z si 
si 1
G(t)g(t)dt+
G2(s) G2(s )
2
#
(12)
where we used the fact that G(1) = a. Integrating by parts
Z si 
si 1
G(t)g(t)dt, we obtain:Z si 
si 1
G(t)g(t)dt = G
2(si ) G2(si 1)
2 . Therefore, as claimed  = a(1  c)  (a)
2
2 . 
Appendix A2.
The fact that the absolute prots of all but the most advanced rm in the industry decrease with
competition is immediate. On the other hand, by Remark 1, the total prots in the industry are
a(1   c)   (a)22 , so the relative prot shares of the rm with rank  is: r() = 1  c
a(1 c)  (a)2
2
.
Taking derivatives with respect to x, where x is either a or  or a, we obtain that:
@
@x
r() =  (1     c) (1  a   c)h
a(1  c)  (a)22
i2 @ (a)@x (13)
By (2), 1  a   c < 0, so @@xr() > 0()  < 1  c. Therefore, as claimed, the relative prot
shares of the most advanced rms increase with an increase in x. 
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Appendix A3.
Since at ti, from the perspective of rm i, t0 is distributed uniformly on [ti   ; ti], the expected
prot of rm i at ti + t from investing in the innovation is pt [1  (tjti)]  c, where
(tjti) 
Z ti
ti 

m(tjti; t0) + n(tjti; t0)
2

1

dt0 (14)
the expected measure of rms that invested before and simultaneously to rm i. We dropped the
conditionals on ti, a and  which are self evident from the context.
The following results describe the expected measure (tjti) for the various strategy proles of
interest.
Lemma 9 Consider a strategy prole under which rms mix between investing at moments f +
1; :::;  + ng with probabilities f1; :::; ng, where n  1, 1 = 0, and the sequence fkg  Z+ is
strictly increasing. Denote by 0  max(0;  + 1   )    . Then, the expected measure of rms
who have already invested before rm ti at moment ti + t is the following.
(tjti) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0, for t 2 [0;  + 0]Xm
k=1
ak
n

2 +min(t     k; )  12 [min(t     k; )]2
o
+
+
Xn
k=m+1
ak
h
(t  k+)2
2
i
, for t 2 [ + m;  + m+1], m 2 f0; :::; ng
a, for t   + n + 
(15)
Proof. We may assume without loss of generality that the randomization over f + 1; :::;  + ng
is made at the beginning of the game so that at each instant t 2 [t0; t0 + ], the mass a of rms
who becomes aware at that moment can be distributed among a set of n groups, where group
k 2 f1; :::; ng will contain the rms that will invest at moment  + k. Thus, at each instant
t 2 [t0; t0 + ] there is a mass ak of rms who become aware of the product and invest with
probability 1 after exactly  + k time units. Denote by k(tjti) the expected measure of rms out
of group k that invested before ti + t, from the perspective of rm ti. Then, we will have:
(tjti) =
Xn
k=1
k(tjti) (16)
Firstly, note that due to the sequential awareness assumption and the fact that all rms wait
the same number of time units, n(tjti; t0) = 0 for all t. Secondly, according to the strategy prole
that we are considering, for a xed value of t0 and for any t  0, the last rm out of group k who
has invested is the one that became aware at ti+t  k, provided that ti+t  k 2 [t0; t0+].
Denote by:
'(tjti; t0; )  ti + t     t0: (17)
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Consider now an arbitrary group k 2 f1; :::; ng. Note rstly that for ti + t      k < t0, no
rm of the group has invested yet while for ti + t     k  t0 +  all rms from the group have
already invested. Secondly, for the remaining case the measure of rms out of the group who have
invested at ti + t is ak'(tjti; t0; ). In conclusion, the measure of rms who have already invested
at ti + t for a xed value of t0 is:
mk(tjti; t0) = akmin(;max('(ti; t;  ; t0); 0)) (18)
If  + 1 >  , take some t 2 [0;  + 1  ), and note that the earliest moment when any rm
could have invested is ti    +  + 1. This corresponds to the case when the rst rm became
aware exactly at ti   . But for t 2 [0;  + 1   ) we have ti    +  + 1 > ti + t, so at
ti + t the expected measure of rms who have invested before rm i is 0. Therefore, (tjti) = 0 for
t 2 [0;max(0;  + 1   )].
Take some moment t 2 [ + m;  + m+1], for some m 2 f0; 1; :::; ng. Consider a group k, with
k  m+ 1, so that t   + k. Note that '(tjti; t0;  + k)   , t0  ti    + (t     k). But
t0  ti    and 0  t     k together imply t0  ti    + (t     k), so '(tjti; t0;  + k)  
for any possible value of t0, as long as t   + k. On the other hand, '(tjti; t0;  + k)  0 ()
t0 < ti + t     k. Therefore, for t 2 [ + m;  + m+1) and k  m+ 1 we have:
k(tjti) =
Z ti+t  k
ti 
ak[(ti + t     k)  t0] 1

dt0 = ak

(t     k + )2
2

(19)
Consider now a group k with k  m so that t >  +k. For any t0 we have '(tjti; t0;  +k)  0
because ti + t      k   t0  0 , t0  ti + t      k, which is true because t   + k and
t0  ti. On the other hand, '(tjti; t0;  + k) >  when ti + t      k > t0 +  () t0 <
ti+ t     k  so over this range of t0 we have that the measure out of group k is ak. Thus,
for t 2 [ + m;min( + m+1;  + k + )) and k  m we have:
k(tjti) =
Z ti +t  k
ti 
(ak)
1

dt0 +
Z ti
ti +t  k
ak[(ti + t     k)  t0] 1

dt0 =
= ak


2
+ (t     k)  (t     k)
2
2

: (20)
For t   + k + , we have k(tjti) = ak. It is easy to see that these can be written concisely
as we do in the text of the Lemma in (15).
Then, (16), (19) and (20) will give the measure as in the text of the Lemma for all t  +n+.
After ti +  + n + , the measure is a for sure. 
Corollary 10 (tjti) is continuous, strictly increasing on [max(0;  + 1   );  + ] and di¤er-
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entiable with a continuous derivative.
Proof. From (19) and (20), it is clear that k(tjti) is continuous and di¤erentiable with a continuous
derivative on [0;  + ]nSnk=0f  + k;  + k + g. For k  1, we have:
lim
t&+k
k(tjti) = lim
t%+k
k(tjti) = ak 
2
and lim
t&+k
@
@t
k(tjti) = lim
t%+k
@
@t
k(tjti) = a
lim
t&+k+
k(tjti) = lim
t%+k+
k(tjti) = ak and lim
t&+k+
@
@t
k(tjti) = lim
t%+k+
@
@t
k(tjti) = 0
On the other hand,
lim
t&max(0;+1 )
k(tjti) = lim
t%max(0;+1 )
k(tjti) = 0 and (21)
lim
t&max(0;+1 )
@
@t
k(tjti) = lim
t%max(0;+1 )
@
@t
k(tjti) = 0 (22)
Therefore, (tjti) is continuous with a continuous derivative on [0;  + ] as a nite sum of
functions with these properties. (tjti) is strictly increasing on [max(0;  + 1 );  +] because
1(tjti) is strictly increasing on this interval, while k(tjti) with k  2 are weakly increasing. 
Corollary 11 Consider a strategy prole under which all rms wait exactly  time units before
investing and then invest with probability 1. Then, the expected measure of rms who have invested
before rm i at moment ti + t is the following.
(tjti) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0, for t 2 [0;max(0;    )]
a
h
(t +)2
2
i
, for t 2 [max(0;    );  ]
a
h

2 + (t  )  (t )
2
2
i
, for t 2 [ ;  + ]
a, for t   + 
(23)
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma 9 by taking n = 1 and 1 = 1.
Corollary 12 Consider a strategy prole under which each rm ti mixes between investing and not
investing with probability  2 (0; 1) at moment ti +  and invests with zero cumulative probability
in the rest of the time. Then, the expected measure of rms who have already invested before rm
ti at moment ti + t is (tjti), where (tjti) is given by Corollary 11.
Proof. Because in the mixed strategy equilibrium each rm invests after  time units with proba-
bility  as opposed to probability 1 in the Corollary 11, it is as if the distribution of rms would
be uniform with density a instead of a over a timespan of length  and each rm would invest
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after  time units with probability 1. By replacing a with a as the density in the Corollary 11,
we obtain the measure (tjti). 
Appendix A4.
We will show that if conditional on an unsuccessful project, the probability of receiving a Pass
signal at ti + t is:
rt = max

e t   p0
e (t )   p0
; 0

(24)
then the resulting unconditional probabilty of receiving a Passsignal is precisely the one dened
in Section 3.1. Thus, denoting by Ft the event of receiving a Failsignal at ti + t and by S the
event that the project is successful, we have:
Pr
 
Ft

= Pr(FtjS) (1  pt ) + Pr(FtjS)pt  = rt  (1  pt ) + pt  (25)
Given the signal structure introduced in Section 3.1, it is straightforward to see that the resulting
law of motion for the posterior belief that the project is successful is the following:
 If p0  pt < 1, then
pt+ =
(
min(1; pte
), with probability max(e ; pt)
0, with probability 1 max(e ; pt)
(26)
with  > 0 and t 2 Z+.
 If pt 2 f0; 1g, for some t, then pt0 = pt for all t0  t. Clearly, for a xed p0, pt can take values
only in the set P (p0; ; )  f0; p0; p0e; p0e2; p0e3; :::; 1g.
Now, if t < tM , (25) becomes Pr
 
Ft

= e
 t p0
e (t ) p0
 
1  p0e(t )

+ p0e
(t ) = e . On the
other hand, at t = tM + , we have e (tM+)  p0 so Pr
 
FtM+

= 0  (1  ptM ) + 1  ptM = ptM .
This completes the argument.
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 2.
We will prove Proposition 2 in three steps. Firstly, in Proposition 13, we will describe the pure
strategy equilibria for the low levels of competition. Then, in Proposition 16 we will argue that
there is a set of maximal values of competition above which the equilibria in Proposition 13 do not
exist. Finally, in Proposition 17 we will describe the equilibria for the higher values of competition.
We start the proof by arguing that we can always restrict attention to action spaces that consist
of investment decisions of rm i at times ti+t, with t 2 [max(0;  );min ( + ; tM + )]\Z+.
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Firstly, as we will show in Appendix A3, under any strategy prole of interest, (tjti) is strictly
increasing in t on the interval [max(0;    );  + ], where  is the minimum amount of time
that any of the competing rms waits before investing according to that strategy prole. Thus,
in this interval, whenever a rms optimal strategy is not to invest as soon as it learns some new
information, then the strategy should prescribe the rm to wait at least  more units of time,
until it receives the next piece of information. Also, we will show that if  > , then (tjti) = 0
on [0;    ] so the rm does not have any incentive to invest before ti +     because, up to
that moment, the expected prot from investing is strictly increasing. This is because the rm
can gather information without risking that other rms invest it. Finally, the rm does not have
any incentive to wait after tM +  because there is no additional information left to acquire. On
a separate note, we mention that given the sequential awareness assumption and the fact that,
apart from this assumption, all rms are identical, in the symmetric strategy proles that we will
consider, no two rms will invest at the same time. Therefore, n(tjti; t0) = 0 for all t.
Denote by
MC;(t) = pt [(t+ jti;  ; )  (tjti;  ; )] (27)
to be the MC of waiting at t if all rms invest at  with probability  and by
MC; ;+;+(t) = pt [(t+ jti;  ;  ;  + ; +)  (tjti;  ;  ;  + ; +)] (28)
the MC of waiting at t if all the other rms mix among investing at one of the two moments
 ;  +  2 Z+ and not investing at all, with probabilities  , + and 1  ++ respectively.
The marginal benet of waiting is dened asMB = c(1 e ). We will show that the interpretation
of the functional forms in the right hand side of these equations is indeed the one suggested by the
name we associate them. We ignore for the time being the constraint that   tM +  assuming
that it does not bind and then in Appendix B4 nd conditions under which the constraint binds.
Also, in Appendix B4, we nd conditions under which rms invest as soon as they learn of the
invention.
Appendix B1. Proposition 13.
Proposition 13 In a symmetric strategy equilibrium, a necessary and su¢ cient set of conditions
for the rms to wait for  2 Z+ before mixing between investing and not investing with probabilities
 and 1  , respectively, with  2 [0; 1] is that:
(1) MC;(   )  MB MC;() (29)
(2) p

1  a
2

  c  0, with equality when  < 1 (30)
(3) 1  a  c, when  < 1. (31)
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Proof. Assume all other rms invest after  time periods and denote by
	(t)  p0(1  (tjti))  ce t, for t  0. (32)
Since the probability of not receiving a Failsignal in the rst t periods, with t 2 Z+ and t < tM
is e t, it follows that 	(t) = e t [pt(1  (tjti))  c] is the expected prots of rm i as of moment
ti from waiting t < tM periods before investing. Thus, to prove the result it is enough to show
that 	() is maximized at t =  in the set [max(0;    );min ( + ; tM + )] \ Z+. From (23),
when t <  , we have 	00(t) =  p000(tjti)   2ce t =  p0 a   2ce t < 0. On the other hand,
for  < t < tM , we have 	000(t) = 3ce t > 0.
Now rstly, the condition p

1  a2

 0, ensures that 	()  0. Secondly, the condition
MC;(   ) MB is equivalent to 	()  	(   ). Therefore, since 	 is concave for t   and
it is increasing at    , it must be that it is increasing for all t      and thus 	(t)  	() for
t   . On the other hand, MB  MC;() is equivalent to 	()  	( + ). Since 	000(t) > 0,
it follows that once 	 is convex, it will be convex for all higher values. Since 	()  	( + ),
	 is decreasing at  . But, 	 can start increasing only after it becomes convex so after it starts
increasing, it will increase forever. Since (31), for the case  < 1, and (2) for the case  = 1, ensure
that 	( + ) < 0, it means that 	(t) < 0 for t   +  when  +   tM . Therefore, as desired,
	()  	(t) for all 0  t  + when +  tM . Since there is no new information arrival after
moment tM , it is straightforward to see that 	()  	(t) for all 0  t  tM when  +   tM .
Finally, note that when  < 1, (30) is necessary to be satised with equality to have the rms
willing to mix, while (31) is necessary because otherwise the rms could deviate and invest after
they remove all uncertainty. 
Corollary 14 In a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for
rms to wait for  2 Z+ before investing is that:
max
 
c
1  a2
;
2
2   1
c(1  e )
a
!
 p  min

2
2   1
c(e   1)
a
; 1

. (33)
Proof. This follows immediately from Proposition 13 and Corollary 11. 
Proposition 15 In a symmetric equilibrium in which all rms mix among investing at one of the
two moments  ;  +  2 Z+ and not investing at all, with probabilities  2 (0; 1), + 2 (0; 1)
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and 1   + + respectively, a set of necessary and su¢ cient conditions is:
p
"
1  a 
2
  a+ (   1)
2 
2
#
= c (34)
p+

1  a


2
+    
2

  a+ 
2

= c (35)
1  a ( + +)   c (36)
Proof. Assume all other rms mix among investing at one of the two moments  ;  +  2 Z+ and
not investing at all, with probabilities  2 (0; 1), + 2 (0; 1) and 1    + + respectively.
Then, as in (32), denote by 	(t)  p0(tjti)  ce t and we will show that 	00(t) < 0 for t <  and
	000(t) > 0 for t >  +  so that the argument from the proof of Proposition 13 will go through in
this case as well with a slight modication.
Employing (15), we have for t <  that
	00(t) =
(
 p0a 1   2ce t, for t < 
p0a
1
   p0a+ 1   2ce t, for  < t <  + 
(37)
On the other hand, 	000(t) = 3ce t for all t. Note that 	00(t) < 0 for t <  and 	000(t) > 0 for
t >  + . Moreover, it can be shown that lim
t%+
	00(t) = p0a 1   p0a+ 1  2ce (+) <
lim
t&+
	00(t) = p0a ( + +) 1   2ce (+). Finally, the condition from (34) and (35) in the
text of the Proposition imposes that 	() = 	( + ) = 0.
We will argue now that 	()  	(t) for all t 2 Z+. Consider two cases. Case 1:   +.
In this case, from (37) it follows that 	00(t) < 0 for t 2 ( ;  + ). Therefore the function 	 is
concave for t <  + . It is clear then that this and 	() = 	( + ) imply that 	0() > 0 and
	0( + ) < 0.45 Since 	000(t) > 0 for t >  + , and (36) implies 	(min( +  + ; tM )) < 0, an
argument similar to the one from the proof of Proposition 13 shows the result. Case 2:  > +.
In this case, 	000(t) > 0 for t   together with the facts that lim
t%+
	00(t) < lim
t&+
	00(t) implies
that once 	 is convex, it will be convex for all higher values. If 	 were increasing at  + , then
it should already be convex there and thus it would be increasing for all values above  + . But
this contradicts the fact that 	() > 0 > 	(min( +  + ; tM )). Therefore, 	0( + ) < 0. Also,
	0() > 0 because otherwise, in order for 	 to be decreasing at  + , it should have increased
somewhere between  and  + , which would imply that 	 was convex at that point and therefore
convex and increasing from that point to  + . But this would contradict the fact that 	 should
be decreasing at  + . The rest of the argument goes as in the previous case. 
45Note that Corollary 10 ensures that the function 	 is di¤erentiable at both  and  + .
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Appendix B2. Proposition 16.
Proposition 16 For any P (p0; ; ), denote by x, a maximal value of competition for which there
exists a waiting time  2 Z+ such that
2
2   1
c(1  e )
a
 p = c
1  a2
 min

2
2   1
c(e   1)
a
; 1

(38)
Then, for any x > x, there is no equilibrium with rms expecting strictly positive prots.
Proof. Let (; x) be a pair with the properties from the text of the Claim. Then this pair must
satisfy:
pe
 >
2
2   1
c(e   1)
a
(39)
because otherwise there would exist a higher value of competition x0 such that ( + ; x0) would
satisfy the properties from the text of the Claim. Now, when x increases above x, rms would
make strictly negative prots if they were all to continue to invest at . Therefore, they would
need to start investing at  +  or later. But, (39) is in that case inconsistent with the necessary
conditions for a pure strategy equilibrium as dened by (33). 
Appendix B3. Proposition 17.
Proposition 17 Let x be any value of competition satisfying (39). Then, for all values of x  x
there exists a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium. In this equilibrium, for any value of p0; one
and only one of the following two cases is true:
1. there exists  2 Z+ and  2 (0; 1) such that all rms wait for a period  2 Z+ and then in
period  mix between investing and not investing with probability .  satises the condition:
p

1  a
2

  c = 0 (40)
2. there exists  2 Z+ such that the equilibrium prescribes that all rms mix among investing at
one of the two moments  ;  +  2 Z+ and not investing at all, with probabilities  2 (0; 1),
+ 2 (0; 1) and 1   + + respectively, satisfying:
p
"
1  a 
2
  a+ (   1)
2 
2
#
  c = 0 (41)
p+

1  a


2
+    
2

  a+ 
2

  c = 0 (42)
36
The resulting equilibrium prole of p and thus of  is weakly increasing in the degree of
competition when x =  and constant when x = a.
Proof. Denote by , the equilibrium waiting time at x and assuming for the time being that   
is not sustainable any type of equilibrium, denote by 1 be a minimal value of competition for which
 is an equilibrium waiting time in pure strategies. Note that at 1, the rms just switched from
investing after + time units to investing after  time units, so they were just indi¤erent between
investing at  and investing at + . Alternatively put, MC+;1() =MC;1() =MB. Now,
in between 1 and x, MC+;1() increases exceeding MB thus making rms deviate and invest
at  if all other rms were to invest at  + . MC;1() also increases above MB thus making
the rms want to invest at  in an equilibrium in which all rms invest at . At x though, the
nonnegative prot constraint binds. Above x, if the all rms were to continue to invest at , they
would make negative prots. To avoid this, rms can either switch immediately to investing at
 +  or can invest in fewer projects. But switching to investing at  +  immediately is not a
feasible equilibrium strategy because MC+;1() would still be higher than MB so provided that
the rest of the rms invest at  + , any rm would be better o¤ deviating and investing at .
Therefore, the rms need to start investing in fewer projects which would have the e¤ect of reducing
the total measure of rms in the market and thus allow for the non negative prots condition to
continue to be satised.
Now, by Corollary 12, we have that in an equilibrium in which all rms mix with probability
, the expected measure of rms who already invested at t + ti is (tjti), with (tjti) as in
Corollary 11. Note that since the rm mixes in period  between investing at that moment and
never investing, its expected prots from investing in period  , p [1 ( jti)] c = p [1 a2 ] c
should be zero, which is the condition in (40).
Claim 18 Let (x) be dened implicitly by the equation p [1 a2 ] c = 0. Then: (i)MC;(a)()
and MC;(a)(   ) are constant in a; (ii) MC;()() and MC;()(   ) are decreasing in .
Proof. MC;() = pa

1  12

, so since  = 2a

1  cp

, from the zero prot condition, we
will have MC
; 2
a

1  c
p
() = p 2

1  cp

1  12

, which is constant in a and decreasing in .
Clearly, MC;(   ) = p a

1  12

satises the same properties. 
Thus, when x = a, the conditions of Proposition 13 are satised for  =  and (a) =
2
a

1  cp

.
On the other hand, MC;()(  ) and MC;()(  ) decrease when  increases above .
SinceMC;()( ) < MB < MC;()(), these inequalities will be also satised for a range of
values of  above . Moreover, from the zero prot conditions at  and , we have that a = a, so
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since 1  ajx=x < c, we will also have 1 a < c. Therefore, by Proposition 13, in equilibrium
rms will invest at  with probability  such that p[1   a2 ]   c = 0. Now, denote by 1, the
value of  for which MC;()() =MB and note that as  increases above 1, the equilibrium in
which all rms invest at  is no longer sustainable. This is because MC;()() < MB so the
rms would deviate and invest at + .
However, note that immediately above 1, a prole of strategies in which all rms would mix at
+  does not constitute an equilibrium. To see this, denote by 0 the mixing probability at  (1)
such that p[1 a0 12 ]  c = 0. Note that MC;(1)() = pa (1) 

1  121

=MB. Now, if
immediately above 1, rms were to mix at+, in order for the zero prot condition to be satised,
since the rms invest in safer projects,  should have an immediate upward jump to 00 >  (1),
where 00 satises p+[1   a00 12 ]   c = 0. But then, MC+;00() = pa00

1  121

>
MC;(1)() = MB. So if all the other rms invest at + , any rms would have an incentive
to deviate and invest at .
Therefore, for a range of values of  above 1, rms would mix among investing at , investing
at  +  and not investing at all. The corresponding mixing probabilities  and + will be
given by the zero prot conditions as in (41) and (42). Note that
() =
1
a
2
2   1

1  c
p+

  1
a
23
(2   1)2
c(1  e )
p
(43)
+() =
1
a
23
(2   1)2
c(e   1)
p+
  1
a
2
2   1

1  c
p

(44)
so a [() + +()]  =
22
2 1
c(1 e )
p
is increasing in . Therefore, since + (1) = 0, we
will have 1  a [() + +()]  < 1  a (1) 1 < c so by Proposition 15, this will constitute
an equilibrium strategy.
As  increases above 1, () decreases and +() increases. Denote by 2 the value of 
that satises () = 0. Then, as competition increases above 1 the equilibrium prescribes that
the rms gradually shift the weight of the mixing probabilities from moment  towards moment
 + , until at 
2
, rms no longer invest at , and mix only between investing and not investing
at +  with probability +(2). Note that above 2, the equilibrium in which rms mix at 
and  +  no longer exists. However, it can be shown that at 
2
, we have MC+;+(2)() =
MC;+(2)
() =MB. Using the same arguments as before, it can be shown that above 
2
, it is
an equilibrium for all rms to mix at + , with a decreasing probability. As shown in Claim 18,
MC+;()(+) andMC+;()() will be decreasing until 2 whereMC+;()(+) =MB
and the rms will start mixing among investing at + , investing at + 2 and not investing at
all and then the process will repeat.
Finally, the fact that  () is decreasing in , while +() is increasing also shows that there
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can be no equilibrium in which rms mix at two moments for those values of competition for which
there exists an equilibrium that prescribes rms to mix only at one moment. To see this, note that
whenever rms mix at two moments, the mixing probability on the later moment should increase
in  in order for the rms to make zero prots at both of those moments. However, we know that
at 1 rms are making zero prot at both  and  + , while the mixing probability at  +  is
zero. Therefore,that probability could have not increased below 1.
The argument for the case in which     is sustainable in a mixed strategy equilibrium is
similar to the one above. If x := a rms start mixing immediately above x between investing at
   and not investing at all, with probabilities strictly lower than 1. If x := , then immediately
above x, rms mix among investing at  , investing at  and not investing at all. As competition
continues to increase, the weight on    decreases, while the weight on  increases until a point
at which rms mix only between investing after  time units and not investing at all. Then the
rest of the argument is as above. This completes the proof of Proposition 17. 
Appendix B4.
Assume rst that     ln p0 2 Z+, so that tM =     ln p0 and ptM = eptM  = 1. Then,
condition (29) from the text of Proposition 13 becomes MCtM ;(tM   )  MB, because the
marginal benet of waiting at tM is zero. In the text of the Corollary 14 this condition becomes
2
2 1
c(e 1)
a  1. Therefore, when 22 1 c(e
 1)
a  1 and 1   a2   c  0 are satised, rms wait
precisely tM periods in equilibrium. Since these two conditions are satised precisely when the level
of competition is small, we conclude as expected that when for low enough values of competition,
rms wait until they remove all uncertainty.
On the other hand, if x that satises 1  a2   c

x=x
= 0, also satises 22 1
c(e 1)
a

x=x
 1,
then no pure strategy equilibrium exists for x > x; this is the counterpart of Proposition 16. Thus,
for x > x, as in Proposition 17, rms start mixing. WhileMCtM ;(x)(tM ) is weakly decreasing in x,
where (x) is dened as in the text of Claim 18, the fact that the marginal benet of waiting at tM
is zero induces rms to invest no later than tM . Since MCtM ;(x)(tM   ) is also weakly decreasing
in x, rms will never invest earlier than tM . Thus, in this case, the equilibrium will specify that
all rms wait precisely tM periods and invest with probability (x). When    ln p0 =2 Z+, the
main di¤erence is that if MCtM ;(tM ) is smaller than the marginal benet of waiting at tM , which
is c(1  ptM ) rms will invest at tM + , but the rest of the analysis is similar.
Finally, note when p0  max

c
1 a 
2
; 22 1
c(1 e )
a

, that is when MB  MC0;1(0) and the
non-negative prot condition is satised at belief p0, then rms invest in development of the new
product as soon as they learn of it. Since 22 1
c(1 e )
a decreases in x, this condition will continue
to be satised as long as p0  c
1 a 
2
. For high enough levels of competition, the non negative prot
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condition is no longer satised and thus rms will start mixing. As in Proposition 17, if x = a they
will mix immediately, while if x =  then they will start mixing later as x increases. This concludes
the proof of Proposition 2. 
Appendix C1. Proof of Proposition 6.
Dene xM as the value of competition that satises:
1
1  a2
=
2
2   1
(1  e )
a
(45)
and for k  0, let
ck  pk

1  a
2

x=xM
Note then that by Proposition 13, Corollary 14 and (45), (xM ) = k when the cost of innovation
is precisely ck. From (45) it also follows that at xM we haveMCk;1(k) =MB, and that when the
cost of innovation is ck, the only value of competition for which a pure strategy exists is xM . Now,
as c increases above ck, there is no value of competition for which pk can be sustained in a pure
strategy equilibrium. To see this, note that if that was possible, it must be that the corresponding
level of competition, call it x, is lower than xM to ensure non-negative prots. But in that case,
MCk;1(k) = pka

1  12

x=x
> MB so rms would wait at k. Therefore, when c increases
above ck, the minimium possible equilibrium value of the belief in the success of the project is
p(k+1).
For a xed value of c, the values of competition for which p(k+1) is a pure strategy equilibrium
belief are given by Corollary 14. Since
p(k+1) = e
pk =
eck
1  aM M 2

x=xM
(46)
the condition from Corollary 14 becomes:
max
 
c
1  a2
;
2
2   1
c(1  e )
a
!
 e
ck
1  a2

x=xM
 min

2
2   1
c(e   1)
a
; 1

(47)
As c increases above ck, (47) reduces to
2
2 1
c(1 e )
a  e
ck
1 a 
2

x=xM
 22 1 c(e
 1)
a . Dene
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therefore x0(c) and x(c) by the following equations:
cke

1  a2

x=xM
=
2
2   1
c(1  e )
a

x=x0(c)
(48)
cke

1  a2

x=xM
=
2
2   1
c(e   1)
a

x=x(c)
(49)
and note then that for a xed value of c, the set of values of competition for which p(k+1) is
sustainable in a pure strategy equilibrium is given by x0(c)  x  x(c). Dene xL  x0(ck) and
note when the cost of innovation is just above ck, the values of competition for which this equation
is satised are precisely the ones that satisfy xL  x  xM . It is straightforward to see that both
x0(c) and x(c) is increasing. However, as c increases, since x(c) increases, at some point c0k we
will have 22 1
(e 1)
a

x=x(c0k)
= 1
1 a 
2

x=x(c0k)
. Dene xH  x(c0k) and note that in fact it does
not depend on k. When c increases above c0k, the non negative prot condition will bind for some
values of competition and the upper bound x(c) will be dened by the equation:
cke

1  a2

x=xM
=
1
1  a2

x=x(c)
(50)
Clearly, x(c) is decreasing in c. It is straightforward to see that the two bounds, x0(c) and x(c),
will be equal precisely when (45) is satised. Dene ck+1 to be the smallest value higher than ck
for which x0(ck+1) = x(ck+1). This completes the proof of the Proposition. 
Appendix C2. Proof of Proposition 7.
The proof of this result is similar to the one of Proposition 6 and thus it will be presented in
less detail. Let 0 be the minimum waiting time sustainable in an equilibrium for all possible
values of  and s. It follows then that that for a xed value of s, 0 is sustainable for  2 
0(s);minf1(s); 2(s)g

, where 0(s), 1(s) and 2(s) are the implicit solutions to the equations:
p0 =
2s2
2s  
c(1  e )
0
(51)
p0 =
2s2
2s  
c(e   1)
1
(52)
p0 =
c
1  22
(53)
It is straightforward to see that as s increases, 0(s) and 1(s) increase, while 2(s) is constant so
(s)  minf1(s); 2(s)g is weakly increasing. Denote by s0 the minimum value of s for which 0 is
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sustainable and by s1 the value of s such that 0(s1) = (s1). When s increases above s1, 0 is no
longer sustainable in a pure strategy equilibrium and the new minimum pure strategy equilibrium
waiting time is 0+ . Clearly, 0(s) as given by (51) will have a downward jump to the value that
satises the equation:
p0+ =
2s2
2s  
c(1  e )

e (54)
The rest of the values of sk can be computed iteratively in a similar manner. Finally, to see that
0(sk 1) < 0(sk), note that they are dened by equations of the type (51) and (54), which are
essentially identical. However, 0(sk 1) satises that equation for a lower value of s and thus is
smaller than 0(sk). Since 0(sk) = (sk) we also have (sk 1) < (sk).46 
Appendix C3.
Lemma 19 If the rms mix with strictly positive probabilities between investing at arbitrary mo-
ments f + 1; :::;  + ng, with 1 = 0, and  + k 2 Z+, for all k, then this set of moments
needs to satisfy one of the following two sets of conditions: (i) 2   1  , 3   2 = ,
4   3  (   1) , 5   4 = , 6   5  (   2) , etc., (ii) 2   1 = , 3   2  (   1) ,
4   3 = , 5   4  (   2) , 6   5 = , etc.
Proof. Assume that there is an equilibrium in which rms mix between investing at moments
f +1; :::;  +ng with probabilities f1; :::; ng, where n  2, 1 = 0, the sequence fkg is strictly
increasing, k > 0 for all k and
Pn
k=1 k = 1. Then, as argued before, since (tjti) is strictly
increasing, we may restrict attention to equilibria corresponding to fkg  Z+.
Take some k 2 f1; :::; n  1g arbitrarily, and denote by:
h(t)  e (t  k) fpt [1  (tjti)]  cg   fp+k [1  ( + kjti)]  cg , for t 2 [0;  + ] (55)
which can be rewritten, using the fact that e (t  k)pt = p+k , as:
h(t) = p+k [( + kjti)  (tjti)] + c
h
1  e (t  k)
i
(56)
Note that given its denition in (55), h(t) represents the deviation prot from investing at +k
to investing at some other point t. Thus, in order for this to be an equilibrium, we would rstly
need to have h(t)  0 for all t 2 Z+.47 Secondly, the fact that the rm is willing to mix between
46Note however that lim
s!s+
k
0(s) < 0(sk) and thus the lower bound does have a downward jump at sk. On the
other hand, lim
s!s+
k
(s) = (sk). However, the set

0(s); (s)

essentially moves to the right as s increases.
47Note that even if h(t) > 0 on for some t =2 Z+ a protable deviation to that t is not possible. This is because
h(t) represents the deviation surplus only for t 2 Z+. In between elements of Z+, the deviation surplus is no higher
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investing at moments  + k and  + l implies that h( + l) = 0, for all l 2 f1; :::; ng. Now, using
Lemma 9, we have that for each m 2 f1; :::; n  1g and for all t 2 [ + m;  + m+1]:
h(t) = p+k
8<:  
Xm
j=1

aj
h

2 +min(t     j ; ) 
[min(t  j ;)]2
2
i
 
 
Xn
j=m+1

aj
h
(t  j+)2
2
i
+ ( + kjti)
9=;+c h1  e (t  k)i
(57)
Firstly, since by Corollary 10, 0(tjti) is continuous, it follows immediately that h0(t) is also contin-
uous. By considering for each term in the sum that gives h(t), the cases when t   + j +  and
then t >  + j + , it is straightforward to see that we can write concisely:
h0(t) = p+k
8<:  
Xm
j=1
aj
h
max

1  (t  j) ; 0
i
+
 
Xn
j=m+1
aj
h
(t  j+)

i 9=;+ ce (t  k) (58)
For t 2 ( + m;  + m+1) n
Sn
j=0f  + j + g, we also have:
h00(t) = p+k

 
Xm
j=1
aj

  1

1ft+j+g

 
Xn
j=m+1
aj

1


  2ce (t  k)(59)
h000(t) = 3ce (t  k) (60)
Take k = 1, and assume k+1 k < , in which case 1ft+j+g = 1, for all t 2 ( + k;  + k+1)
and j 2 f1; :::; ng. Note that lim
t%+m
h00(t) < lim
t&+m
h00(t) for m 2 fk; k + 1g and h000(t) > 0 imply
that h00(t) is strictly increasing on [0;  + k+1]. Therefore, there exists t 2 [0;  + k+1], such that
h00(t) < 0 for t 2 [0; t), and h00(t) > 0 for t 2 (t; +k+1]. On the other hand, since h is continuous on
[+k; +k+1], and since h(+k) = h(+k+1) = 0, we have either h0(+k) < 0 < h0(+k+1)
or h0( + k) > 0 > h0( + k+1).
Case 1: h0( + k) < 0 < h0( + k+1). This means that h0() must be already increasing at
 +k+1, so t <  +k+1. Thus, h00(t) > 0 for all t >  +k+1 and since h0( +k+1) > 0 and h0() is
continuous, it must be that h0(t) > 0 for all t 2 [ + k+1;  + ]. In particular, h(+k+1+) > 0,
so this case cannot be part of an equilibrium. Therefore, it must be that k+1   k  .
Case 2: h0( + k) > 0 > h0( + k+1). We will show that in this case, it must be that
k+1 k = . To see this, assume by contradiction that k+1 k  2, and note that in that case,
we must have h( + k + ) < 0, because otherwise the rm would deviate and invest at  + k + .
Since h is continuous and h0( + k+1) < 0, there must exist some t0 2 ( + k + ;  + k+1) such
that h0(t0) > 0, because h must be strictly positive just below  + k+1. Similarly, there must exist
some t00 2 ( + k;  + k + ) such that h0(t00) < 0. But since h0(t00) < 0 < h0(t0), it means that
than the than the deviation surplus to the highest element of Z+ that is smaller than t. This is due to the discrete
updating of the belief.
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h0 is already increasing at t0, so h0( + k+1) > h(t0) > 0. This contradicts the initial assumption.
Therefore, if k+1   k < , it must be that k+1   k = .
Therefore, the analysis of the two cases reveals that in order to have an equilibrium, we must
either have h0( + 1) < 0 and 2   1  , or h0( + 1) > 0 and 2   1 = .
If h0(+1) < 0, then note that since 2 1  , then it must be that 1ft+1+g = 0, for all
t 2 ( + 2;  + 3) and 1ft+j+g = 1, for all t 2 ( + 2;  + 3) and j 2 f2; :::; ng. Therefore,
h00 is again increasing on ( + 2;  + 3). So repeating the argument in Case 2 above, we conclude
that it must be that 3 2 = , and that h0( +3) < 0. Assume now that 4 3 < (   1) , and
note that in this case, we have 1ft+1+g = 0 for all t 2 ( + 3;  + 4) and 1ft+j+g = 1,
for all t 2 ( + 3;  + 4) and j 2 f2; :::; ng. Therefore, repeating the argument that we used for
the Case 1 above, we conclude that this cannot be part an equilibrium. Thus, it must be that
4   3  (   1)  and h0( + 3) > 0. Then, using the same type of arguments, it follows that
5   4 = , 6   5  (   2)  and so on.
If h0( + 1) > 0, then h0( + 2) < 0 and it can be showed as we did above for Case 1, that
unless 3   2 > (   1) , this cannot be part of an equilibrium. It follows then iteratively that it
must be that 4   3 = , 5   4  (   2) , 6   5 =  and so on. 
Therefore, in order to have an equilibrium in which rms mix between investing at various
moments in time, the function h should have an extremely specic shape, in which it takes values
of 0 at points in between which the distances alternate between very large and very small values.
Generically, such a shape is impossible to be attained. For instance, consider the following virtually
randomly chosen values of the parameters:  = 0:4,  = 0:2,  = 5 and assume that there is an
equilibrium in which rms mix between innovating after three di¤erent waiting times. By Lemma
19, the three waiting times can either be (i)  ,  +    +  and  +  +  or (ii)  ,  +  and
 +    + , for some  > 0. To simplify the illustration, assume that  = . 48
For case (ii), consider rst the case when the three mixing probabilities add up to 1. Then,
we have a system of 3 equations in 3 unknowns (1; 2; 3) given by h( + ) = 0, h( + ) = 0
and 1 + 2 + 3 = 1 which gives us 1; 2; 3 as a function of x  apc . In order for this to be
an equilibrium, it is also necessary that h(   ) < 0, which can be calculated that holds only if
x < 0:7805. But when this condition is satised, it can be shown that 2 < 0, which is impossible.
Second, consider the case when 1 + 2 + 3 < 1. In this case rms should expect zero prots so
1; 2; 3 are given by h( + ) = 0, h( + ) = 0, p [1   ( jti)]   c = 0. Solving this system
for i  ai, i = 1; 2; 3 as a function of y  pc , we obtain that x > 1:08 from 3 > 0, which
then can be shown that implies 1 < 0. For case (i), if 1 + 2 + 3 = 1, the other two equations
are h( + ) = 0, h( +  + ) = 0. Solving the system for 1; 2; 3 as a function of x  apc ,
we obtain that x > 2:80 from 1 > 0, which then can be shown that implies 2 < 0. Finally, if
48 It is actually intuitive that when  is higher, the set of necessary conditions that h needs to satisfy is stricter.
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1+2+3 < 1, the three equations are: h( + ) = 0, h( + + ) = 0, p [1  ( jti)]  c = 0.
Solving this system for i  ai, i = 1; 2; 3 as a function of y  pc , we obtain immediately that
2 < 0, which is impossible.
Appendix C4. Proof of Proposition 8.
As mentioned in the main text, we will nd the equilibrium under the continuous information
acquisition process by taking the limit  ! 0 and keeping the length of the awareness window
 constant. This can be accomplished by denoting M  , substituting M for  and taking
the limit  ! 0 in the results obtained from the analysis of the discrete case. It can be shown
that the necessary condition (29) becomes now 2M2M 
c(1 e )
a  p  2M2M  c(e
 1)
a so taking the
limit  ! 0 we obtain p = ca . On the other hand, (30) becomes p  c1 aM
2
. Therefore, a
pure strategy equilibrium in which  = 1 exists when a
 
1  aM2
  1. Clearly, this condition
is satised for values of x that are small enough. Finally, note that the equilibrium value of p is
decreasing in a but does not depend on M .
Now, using an argument similar to the one from Appendix B2, it can be shown that for values
of x higher than x where a
 
1  aM2

x=x
= 1 a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist. Instead,
employing again Proposition 13, we obtain that a necessary and su¢ cient set of conditions for
the rms to mix at moment  between investing and not investing with probability  < 1 is that
p =
c
a , p =
c
1 aM
2
and 1   aM  c. As in Appendix B3 it can be shown that the last
condition is satised whenever the rst two conditions are. The mixing probability  satises thus:
c
a =
c
1 aM
2
, which can be rewritten as: a

1 + M2

= . Therefore, if a increases,  must
decrease at the same rate to keep a constant; since p =
c
a , the equilibrium value of p also
remains constant. On the other hand, if M increases,  decreases and p =
c
a increases. This
completes the proof. 
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